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Introduction; After the Nicaraguan Revolution the struggle continues 
At this moment the Nicaraguan Revolution is nearly three years old. 
After July 1979 the new Sandinist Government initiated an impressive 
programme for the reconstruction and structural transformation of the 
economy and the society. 
This so-called 'transition strategy' is being broadly discussed within 
Nicaragua. It is a major theme in underdeveloped countries that started 
since the Russian Revolution a socialist development strategy, but it 
has to be reformulated for the specific economical, political and social 
circumstances of the Nicaraguan society. 
In the Netherlands several independent working groups are executing 
research work connected with the economie transition policy of Nicaragua. 
Within Nicaragua several research institutes, devoted to these themes, 
have been constructed. 
In order to keep contact between these activities on February 26th, 1982 
the Department of Development and Agricultural Economics of the Free 
University, Amsterdam, organized a seminar around the transition strategy 
of Nicaragua. The organization of the seminar served a threefold purpose: 
a) to contribute to the scientific understanding of the specific features 
of the Nicaraguan transition strategy, 
b) to coordinate the research (and development cooperation) projects on 
Nicaragua in the Netherlands, 
c) to organize a joint contribution to the research work done in Nicaragua 
at the moment, with the intention of realizing mutual exchange of 
thought and- if possible - to deliver a contribution to the Nicaraguan 
revolutionary process. 
The seminar was attended by some 40 participants, representatives of a 
number of Dutch universities and research institutes, students working 
groups and the national and local solidarity committees with the people 
of Nicaragua (see: list of participants). The Nicaraguan ambassador for 
the Benelux and the Nicaraguan representative for the Netherlands were 
present at the seminar as honorary guests. 
'See, C. Bettelheim, "Class struggle in the USSR", (vol. 1 & 2), Hassocks, 
1978 (for a discussion on the Soviet-transition-strategy) and his more 
general analysis of transition in "the transition to a socialist economy", 
Hassocks, 1975. 
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A number of participants presented a working paper to the seminar with 
some propositions concerning their research work. These papers are 
included in this seminar folder. Other participants informed the seminar 
by means of a short notice about their current research progress 
(see: appendix, list of current research projects). 
Because of the limited time available during the seminar, only some 
headlines of the Nicaraguan transition strategy could be discussed 
(see: programme). The discussions concentrated on three main subjects: 
1. the social class structure and the Politics of Transition in Nicaragua. 
2. the political economy of the transition strategy in Nicaragua. 
3. agrarian transition and the role of the agricultural sector in the 
Nicaraguan transition strategy. 
In this introduction we will give a short overview of the discussion papers 
presented to the seminar, and a summary of the most important points of 
controversy that emerged during the discussions. It is our interition to 
continue the joint research contribution and the interchange of views 
concerning the Nicaraguan transition strategy. In this respect, the 
seminar only laid the foundation for a future research and action programme 
in order to contribute to the prolonged struggle of the Nicaraguan people 
for independence, justice and equality. 
The concept of transition in Nicaragua 
The concept of transition concerns the question how a socialist society 
can be constructed in a country where the level of development of the 
productive forces (the objective conditions in classical Marxist theory) 
have not yet reached full maturity. In Marx's theory, the revolutiónary 
overthrow of the capitalist social order is part of the materialist 
conception of the dialectics of historical change, in that sense that the 
forces of production are no longer compatible with the class relations in 
which they operate . Because of the development of capitalism into 
imperialism, in underdeveloped countries the objective conditions no 
longer coincide with the level of development of class struggle (the 
subjective conditions). After the seizure of power by means of a revolutión-
ary popular struggle, these countries have to pass through a process of 
JM.C. Howard & J.E. King, "The political economy of Marx", Thatford, 1975, 
Ch. 1 & 2. 
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'structural transformation' of the economie, as well as the social and 
political structures . 
In general terms transition refers to a complete change of the social 
formation, including the mode of production, the political superstructure 
and the ideology. In recent years, the German-French-Italian discussions 
on the role of the state threw more light on the question of the 'dominant 
2) 
sphere' m the transition to socialism in underdeveloped countries . 
No longer only the economie substructure determines the beginning and the 
course of the transformation process, but the role of the superstructure 
(the so-called ideologie state-apparatus) gained influence. A backward 
economie reality can be compensated for by an advanced level of political 
organization and ideological formation. 
By consequence, the transition process can no longer be analyzed as a mere 
one-directional mechanical process, but it has to be seen in the context of 
a transformation of the whole social formation. Also, the specific 
circumstances in different countries have to be taken into account in the 
analysis of transition (such as: the character of the liberation struggle, 
the economie structure of society and the emerging class struggle). 
For the Nicaraguan transition process this development of theory means 
that besides several general elements of the transition strategy, also 
the specific dialectics of the Nicaraguan social formation should be 
analyzed. 
The general element concerns the question of 'original (primitive) socialist 
accumulation', which means the initiation of an autonomous, national 
directed accumulation process in order to reach foreign independence, 
food self-sufficiency and a more balanced domestic economie (and 
distributional) structure. 
More important for the Nicaraguan transition strategy are the specific 
conditions under which this process takes place. Major questions in this 
respect are: the composition of class structure, employment and distribu-
tional impact of the transformation of the relations of production, new 
Reference can be made to socialist underdeveloped countries in transition, 
like Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, etc. 
2) 
See for this discussion, the contributions of E. Altater, L. Althusser, 
N. Poulantzas, E. Laclau and A. Gramsci 
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organizational forms of production (APP, cooperatives), the role of the 
state, etc. 
In the following paragraphs and in the seminar papers a number of these 
themes will be analyzed. Special attention will be paid to the dialectics 
of the transition process, originating from the economie, social and 
political structures of the peripheral capitalistic structure in Nicaragua. 
In the first place, the question of the social class structure underlying 
the Nicaraguan Revolution will be discussed, in order to get a clear 
impression of the structural composition of the Nicaraguan society. In 
this respect especially the relations between the material basis and the 
social relations of production are important (the excessive articulation of 
the relations of production as class consequence of peripheral capitalist 
development). This analysis is extremely relevant with respect to the 
political position of the state after the revolution, the relation of the 
state vis-a-vis the different social classes and the class-implications 
of polic-y doei siotiK. The? basic question in this respect concerns the 
direct ion of the further development of the popular basis of the Sandinist 
regime and the influence of the so-called superstructure (the role of the 
state and the ideology) in this process. 
In the second place, the economie strategy of transition will be discussed-
especially the new dynamics of the accumulation process and the way in 
which the major economie problems of the economie transformation process 
in Nicaragua (technological dependence, trade dependence, industrial 
stagnation, dualist agricultural structure, foreign debt) can be handled. 
Most important in this section is the question how an economie transformation 
can be executed with a simultaneous modification of the social relations 
of production (ownership, labour relations, organizational forms of 
production) within the context of a planned mixed economie system. This 
appears to be a very difficult problem, for the very reason that the logic 
of the accumulation process in the pre-revolutionary economie system was 
founded on the prevalent articulation of social relations (overexploitation 
of the semi-proletariat; inflationary pressure on popular consumption). 
In the third place, the role of the agricultural sector in the transition 
strategy will be analyzed. Within agriculture many of the general economie 
problems of transition are materialized. Because the agricultural sector 
performs a central role of the financing of the development process - both 
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in the Somoza period as we 11 as in the post-revolutionary strategy - it 
is important to notice whether there exist margins for change in the 
'logic' of the economie process. Land reform, agricultural policy and 
new organizational forms of agricultural production will be discussed 
in view of their influence on an integrated process of economie growth 
and income distribution. 
The following introduction tries to integrate the before mentioned central 
elements of the Nicaraguan transition strategy, It is not intended to 
give a complete analysis of the Nicaraguan economie policy, but morely 
as an 'agenda' for future discussions and research. As such, it needs 
to be extended, since the Nicaraguan economie transition strategy 
reflects the dynamic nature of the Nicaraguan revolutionary process. 
Social Class Structure and the Politics of transition in Nicaragua 
The first part of the seminar dealt with the historical development 
of the mode of production in Nicaragua and the emerging class structure. 
In order to study the concept of transition in the Nicaraguan case, one 
has to deal with the material basis of the revolutionary alliance 
underlying the Nicaraguan revolutionary process. 
The contribution of Ken Post focusses on the composition of the 
revolutionary block in Nicaragua and the 'politics of transition' 
(which can be defined as the process of production and transformation 
of class power). His major proposition is, that because of the relative 
late chrystallization of the revolutionary block in Nicaragua, the Frente 
Sandinista has a rather generalized and diffused ideological position 
and political composition. 
The historical development of peripheral capitalism ('intermediate 
integration') causes a diversity of modes of production ('hybridization') 
and consequently a very complex structure of class positions and social 
groups not definable as classes (women, youth, ethnic groups). The 
peripheral incorporation in the world capitalist system and the enforced 
position of external realization (agro-exportmodel), along with a low 
development of the productive forces leads to a high level of semi-
2) 
proletarization and urbanization . In these circumstances, the revolu-
tionary struggle has to compete for state power and the political-military 
confrontation precedes the economie, social and ideological transformation . 
see his paper, "The seizure of power in Nicaragua and the politics of the 
socialist transition" in this folder. 
2) 
for an historical description of the process of primitive accumulation 
and the semi-proletarization, linked with the introduction of coffee in 
Nicaragua, see: J. Wheelock, "Imperialismo y Dictatura", Mexico, 1975. 
3) 
see : 0. Nuïïez,"The third social force in national liberation movements", 
in: Latin American Perspectives, spring, 1981; also: G.E. Lenski,"Power and 
Privilige - a theory of social stratification", New York, 1966. 
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The FSLN originally operated on the lines of the foco-strategy 
(Che Guevara) and considered itself as a revolutionary vanguard. At 
the end of the 1960's - after being defeated several times in military 
actions - major weight was placed on political work and popular 
organization. After a period of strategie discussions and the emergence 
of three distincy fractions, the Frente was re-united again in March, 
19792). 
A more specific factor underlying the ultimate broad opposition to Somoza 
concerns the so-called bourgeois democratie opposition (UDEL). This 
opposition arose especially in the 1970's because of the Somozist 
. . . 3) 
discrimmative use of the state apparatus . The state no longer acted 
as a representative of all capitalist classes, but was monopolized by 
a minority of the dominant capitalist class and consequently conflicts 
within the bourgeoisie intensified the crisis of the regime. 
After the revolution these specific circumstances of the revolutionary 
struggle (massive popular participation instead of a real class struggle) 
and the conditions under which the seizure of power takes place, define 
the political position of the new government. In general terms, the 
discussion focusses on the choice between the continuation of a broad 
political coalition or a more revolutionary vanguard policy. 
The latter policy means that the revolutionary government has to 'transform 
the capitalist class away' and that in the long run, former allies in the 
revolutionary block have to be attacked. Only by means of consolidation 
of power in the hands of a cohesive revolutionary vanguard, the Frente can 
escape power-sharing formulas and initiate a consistent social and economie 
4) 
transition process . This means that class struggle must be intensified 
in order to give a clear orientation to the transition process. 
O, R. Debray,"Strategy for Revolution; Essays on Latin America", London 1965, 2) 
see for a clear exposition, Humberto Ortega Saayedra," 50 anös de lucha 
Sandinista", Managua, 1979. 
3) 
H. Jung, "Nicaragua, Bereicherungsdiktatur und Volksaufstand", Frankfurt, 
1981. The word "Bereicherungsdiktatur" refers to the personal enrich-
ment practices of Somoza through the medium of the state apparatus 
(especially in reconstruction boom after the 1972 earthquake). 
4) 
see: J. Petras, "Whither the Nicaraguan Revolution?", in: Monthly Review, 
Vol.31, No.5, October 1979. 
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On the other hand, the present option for a continuation of a broad 
political coalition takes the line that there exist structural economie 
reasons for political pluralism. The mixed economie system simply 
demands a more heterogeneous composition of government and the incorpora-
tion of loyal opposition in the institutional arrangements. Besides, 
a conscious non-identification of the movement/party with the state 
is a conditio sine qua non for the state's role as 'mediator' and for 
affiliation to a more associated model of development (e.g. joint 
ventures with foreign capital). But this does not automatically mean 
that the government always has to resign to 'compromise politics'. One 
has to realize that all policy decisions have class implications. Therefore, 
the consolidation of the political alliance of workers and peasants and 
the broadening of the class basis of the regime can be based on a consistent 
economie policy , (basic needs first and management of the internal terms 
of trade in favour of workers and peasants) and new forms of popular 
organization (real popular participation as democratie model). 
Most important in the indicated controversy is the role of the state 
vis-a-vis the different social classes and political organizations, including 
the Frente. The Nicaraguan organizational-institutional structure and 
philosophy represents a number of new and original elements. The positión 
of the FSLN, originating in its undisputed command of the armed opposition 
agaihst Somoza, moved towards further consolidation of power through its 
hegemony in the military, political and social spheres. The diffuse class 
structure in Nicaragua,together with the nationalist/populist (non-class 
form) ideologie basic of Sandinism were very important reasons the 
Sandinist Front opted for organizing the popular classes directly (CDS's, 
. . 2) 
militias, etc.) instead of creating a monolithic political party . In 
the longer run, direct popular organization and participation can create 
room for a more mediating role of the state ,and a more indirect control on the 
state apparatus by the Frente. By means of Sandinist popular organizations 
a policy of popular mobilization can be converted into permanent institution-
alized means of expression of the people, and the division between the 
3) . . 
party and people should be avoided • Thus, the consolidation of the political 
support for the Frente ultimately depends on the distribution of material 
gains and real political influence (democratization). 
CD. Deere & P. Marchetti,"The worker-peasant alliance in the first year of 
the Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform", in: Latin American Perspectiyes, spring, 
1981. 
2) 
see: S.M. Gorman, "Power and Consolidation in the Nicaraguan Revolution", 
in Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol.13, No.1, January 1981. 
3)J.F. Petras & M. Selden, 'Het wereldsysteem in de Overgang', Derde Wereld 
82, no.1, Febr. 1982. 
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During the transitional phase, a process of development of the forces 
of production can be initiated to facilitate the gradual social and 
economie transformation. The FSLN-hegemony of the state-apparatus 
(including the army, foreign trade and banking) guarantees the control 
of the surplus-utilization process which can be used for redistribu-
tional purposes. In the meanwhile the private sectors can continue to 
fulfil their functions in the reconstruction process, while the state 
performs a 'mediating' role . Therefore the Nicaraguan model of the 
state can be described as a 'small state' which only controls the 
circulation (production and trade conditions) and accumulation (surplus 
utilization), instead of full control over the direct material produc-
tion. 
Within this 'model' special attention has to be paid to the development 
of class structure. In the first place it can be said that excessive 
articulation of the mode of production (corresponding with income 
disparities) has to be avoided. But, in the second place, it is 
important to notice that the development of the Nicaraguan economie 
structure in the past is responsible for this excessive articulation. 
Especially the high level of rural semi-proletarization (caused by the 
dual structure of agriculture) and the relatively strong development 
of rural and urban middle classes can be related to the liberal capitalist 
development model during the Somoza period. 
After the revolution only two strategies are available to solve this 
problem. The first one, with reference to the rural sector, aims at 
further proletarization of the rural semi-proletariat, in order to be 
able to oppose the 'overexploitation' of the peasantry (bettef wages 
and working conditions). 
The second one, with reference to the middle classes, aims at strengthen-
ing of progressive middle class organization (UNAG, ANDEN) in order to 
enable them to formulate their own economie and political position 
vis-a-vis the upper classes. Others speak of a 'transformation of the 
middle sectors into working class, in order to continue their contribu-
2) 
tion to the revolutionary project' . While the first option focusses 
on the progressive role of the middle class in the ideological and 
J. Petras,"Nicaragua, the transition to a new society", in Latin American 
Perspectives, spring 1981. This article indicates a shift of view to a 
more moderate position, compared to Petras' earlier article in Monthly 
Review (Oct. 1979) 
'O. Nunez, op. cit., p.21. 
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political transformation of the social formation, the second option 
concentrates on the disproportionate economie position of middle classes 
m tne economie process 
Thé political economy of the transition strategy of Nicaragua 
The second part of the seminar concentrated on the economie problem of 
2) 
the Nicaraguan transition strategy . In the Nicaraguan economie 
3) planning the most important economie debate centres around the balance 
between accumulation and (basic and non-basic) consumption. FitzGerald 
deals with this problem by extending the classical two department model 
(Feld'man) to a three-sector model in the kaleckian tradition, in a way 
that both economie growth and income distribution effects can be calcu-
lated. 
In the second place, the discussion focusses on the most appropriate 
economie basis for the accumulation process. Because of its small si ze 
and the open economie system (technological dependence, energy imports), 
the Nicaraguan economy has to rely on foreign trade to finance economie 
development. Since industrialization is limited by the market potential 
4) 
(small domestic market; stagnation of the CACM ), the accumulation 
process almost totally centres around the agricultural export sector. 
Industrial development is promoted in sectors related to agriculture 
(forward and backward linkages). 
Thus the agricultural sector is the main source of accumulation funds 
(exports), but at the same time agriculture has to provide for wage goods 
(food). Consequently the classical 'industrialization debate' is 
replicated within the agricultural sector. In the short time export crops 
are necessary for the promotion of foreign exchange (to finance necessary 
See: E. Laclau, "Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory", London 
1978. 
2) 
see papers E.V.K. FitzGerald, "Economie Problems in the analysis of transi-
tion in Nicaragua", and R. Ruben, "Transfer mechanisms and the political 
alliance", A report of the discussions is included in the last section. 
3) 
MIPLAN, "Programa de Reactivacion en Beneficio del Pueblo 1980", and 
"Programa de Austeridad y Eficiencia 1981". 
4) 
However, the victory of the FMLN in El Salvador will be of great importance 
for the long-run industrialization perspectives of Nicaragua. 
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imports), but on the other hand there is an increase in domestic food 
demand, caused by more employment, higher wages and general rising 
expectations. 
The most important question, related to the way Nicaragua should handle 
this. dilemma, concerns the organization of the surplus-mobilization 
process. Ruben suggest that by means of indirect mechanisms the state 
controls the circulation and accumulation spheres and therefore performs 
a major function in the direction of the surplus utilizing and transfer 
processes. The Nicaraguan state is "more interested in controlling the 
productive proces (the direction of the flow of funds, including invest-
ment, domestic and foreign trade, labour, etc), than in controlling 
(which means: managing) directly all means of production ..." 
Related to these general elements of the economie transition is the 
question of the long-term accumulation basis of the Nicaraguan economie 
system. This question refers to the policy of structural economie 
change in relation to the foreign trade strategy. In order to acquire 
a more 'independent' accumulation basis, important changes are necessary 
in exports (predominantly agricultural) and imports (energy and industrial 
products). In the field of exports is opted for 'diversification of 
export dependency' by products and regions. For the longer run, a strategy 
of export-substitution and food exports is being designed tö complement 
the traditional exports. By increasing the production and processing of 
basic grains for export ( after domestic food self-sufficiency has been 
reached) a new partnership of peasants (cooperatives) and the state should 
reduce the degree of exploitation much more quickly than neglecting 
2) . . 
peasant production . Moreover, regional market possibilities, prices, 
relatively simple technology, the availability of ample land and positive 
spill-over effects are other major arguments for a food export strategy. 
In the field of imports, non-essential (luxury) imports have to be 
diminished. Industrial products will be imported only as far as they 
cannot be produced inside Nicaragua. Energy-impotts should be diminished 
Interview with Jaime Wheelock in Ceres, Vol.14, No.5, Sept/Oct 1981; 
"more than control of the means of production we are interested in controlling 
the economie surplus in order to distribute justly the nation's wealth". 
2) 
UNRISD, "Food systems and society; the case of Nicaragua", Gevena, June 1981. 
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by means of local development of hydro-energy and geothermic-energy 
(and perhaps also gasohol). Most important however, is the foreign-
trade balance. It has to be avoided that balance of payments 
deficits are transferred to the population in the form of inflationary 
pressure or huge debt service ratios. 
A very important aspect of the political economy of the transition 
strategy of Nicaragua concerns the study of the relations of production. 
As described earlier, the traditional agro-export model and the capitalist 
modernization during the Somoza-period were based on a particularly 
strong articulation of the relations of production and a special character 
of the class-structure. In general terms, the model has been built on 
excessive semi-proletarization, both in urban and in rural sectors. In 
agriculture, the expansion of capital-intensive export-sectors (coffee, 
cotton, livestock) pushed aside the many small farmers to marginal 
grounds in the interior part of the country or on the mountain-slopes. 
About 80% of these farmers were forced to supply labour-services to the 
export-sectors during the harvesting season in order to supplement their 
incomes. Others were completely expelled out of the agricultural business, 
leading to a concentration of population in urban centres. But these 
migrants were unable to find employment in the equally capital-intensive 
export industries and joined the large urban informal sector . Besides 
a steadily growing mass of marginalized elements (serving as 'labour 
reserve army' to press down wages), a large middle stratum (small handi-
crafts, intellectuals, employees, etc.) emerged as a significant political 
2) factor 
After the revolution, these particular relations of production made high 
demands upon the labour policy. In the long run the problem has to be 
handled by means of a transformation of the mode of production, for 
example mechanization of export agriculture, cooperative food production, 
labour-intensive industrialization, etc.. At short notice, the excessive 
articulation of the relations of production can be seized upon by introduc-
3) ing 'another logic' within the system . This means that higher wages, 
see for an exposition of the Nicaraguan class structure after 1950, 
H. Jung, "Behind the Nicaraguan Revolution", in: New Left Review, 
No. 117, Sept/Oct 1979. 
2) 
Ibid., P.72; in 1973 urban middle class comprised almost one-fifth of 
the EAP, but in later years this class also was restricted by Somocist 
discrimination. 
3) /See: "Einige Aspekte der Wirtschaft Nicaraguas", okt. 1981. 
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better labour conditions and greater worker control could be introduced 
in order to eliminate the over-exploitation of labour-force . In this 
respect, income redistribution policies (including the management of 
internal terms of trade) can be used to supplement the protection of 
both rural and urban wage-labour without the total elimination of 
semi-proletarian labour (and, to some extent, even to attract more 
temporary labour). In addition, state control over the surplus-utilizing 
(and transfer-)process is used in a way that the export-surplus is 
directed to finance government expenditure on collective and social 
services and accumulation. No longer is accumulation being financed 
by means of inflationary pressure on the population, but the export 
sectors directly supply financial funds fox accumulation. 
However, the realization of such a policy encounters a number of very 
important restrictions. 
In the first place, the most important problem facing the state is its 
'relative autonomous' position, which will cause a tendency towards a 
2) fiscal crisis . Shortage of techmcians limits the further expansion 
of the state sector; therefore 'consolidation' rather than expansion is 
their first aim. In the second place, the improvement of working 
conditions (wages, labour hours) exerts a negative influence on labour 
productivity and hence on the total size of the economie surplus. Also 
3) 
higher consumption limits the real surplus . In the third place, the 
political alliance between different economie strata greatly depends on 
an equal distribution of benefits. Therefore, it has to be avoided 
creating privileged minorities in state enterprises or in the state 
bureaucracy. Also regional and sectoral investment plans have to deal 
with these distribution objectives. 
To escape from these restrictions, inherent to the still prevailing 
capitalist mode of product ion, the Nicaraguan economie policy has to 
rely on a simultaneous process of distributive economie growth and 
transformation of the structure of the economy. In the short run there 
will be little room for excessive wage-demands and government expenditure 
XavierGorastiaga speaks in connection with this about "a thrickle-up economy". 
2) 
In f.'act, mflation in the second half of 1979 and in 1980 was even higher 
than in the first half of 1979, which indicates a process of deficit-
financing of the reconstruction process. 
3) . . . . . . . 
By means of shiftmg consumption practices it is tried to protect the export 
surplus (restrictions of domestic consumption of sugar and meat, promotion of 
maize- consumption). 
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can only expand moderately (supplémented by popular campaigns for 
education, health, etc). To escape from the dominant peripheral 
mode of production a considerable part of the surplus has to be 
directed to the structural transformation of the economy, to initiate 
a less dualistic structure of the economy (improving production 
conditions), in order to realize a more independent and egalitarian 
economie model. 
The Agrarian Transition and the role of the agricultural sector in 
the Nicaraguan transition strategy 
The third part of the seminar paid special attention to the role of 
the agricultural sector in the Nicaraguan transition strategy 
Because of the dominant position the agricultural sector occupies 
within the Nicaraguan economy (22% of domestic production, 45% of 
employment, 75% of export earnings), it is very important to analyse 
the implications of the traditional agro-export model for the 
dynamics of the economy as a whole, as well as for the relations of 
production within the agricultural sector. 
In general terms, the agricultural sector performs major functions in 
the financing of overall economie development and contributes to the 
domestic food supply and employment creation. However, what is most 
important, the dualistic nature of the agricultural sector results in 
a sharp differentiation between the large-scale capital intensive export 
sectors (cotton, cofffe, sugar, meat) and a great number of small food-
producing farmers (beans, maize). 
Blokland states in his contribution that it is very important to realize 
that the peasant economy is not a different mode of production, but 
incorporated in the capitalist economy. The peasants sub-sectors 
contribute to capitalist accumulation by means of cheap seasonal wage-
labour (wages below reproduction costs of labour) and by means of cheap 
2) food supply to the cities (and consequently low urban wages) 
see the papers of J.P_. de Groot, "Nicaraguan agrarian reform: constraints 
and policy options", K. Blokland, "Transition with peasants", and J. Algra 
& L. Clercx, "Credit and Growth of small scale food production in Nicaragua. 
2) 
this so-called 'peasant-plantation system' and the monopolization of 
resources on which it is based, has been described in detail by G.L. 
Beckford, "Persistent Poverty", New York, 1972. 
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The most important consequence of this view if that accumulation through 
agricultural exports can only take place in a situation of 'overexploita-
tion'. 
The post-revolutionary agricultural reform policy in Nicaragua therefore, 
has to deal with the position of the peasants in particular. 
In the first place, attention has been paid to the process of land-reform 
in the contribution of J.P. de Groot. After the first phase of land-reform 
nearly 25% of agricultural land (19% of agricultural production) is being 
confiscated by the state. However, the direct government influence is 
restricted to control over land property, processing and (export)trade only 
in the export sectors. In the short run political, financial, economie 
and managerial constraints limit a further process of land-acquisition. 
Several policy-options have been suggested to overcome these constraints 
in order to reduce the dependence of the country on the landowner-
entrepreneur class. 
Here we reach the second point of discussion, viz. the agrarian policy. 
Within the framework of a mixed economie system and while co-existing 
several 'types' of production within the agricultural sector, a coherent 
agricultural reform programme has to be designed to ensure state control 
over the agricultural sector. By combining labour-policy, land-rent 
controls, price policies for inputs and outputs, marketing policy and 
credit and extension , especially small farmers and cooperatives can 
be incorporated in redistributional process. Also in the field of 
agricultural policy the government policy meets its limitations. The 
contribution of J. Algra and L. Clercx examines a number of these 
constraints with regard to present credit-policy. Especially in credit-
provision, important changes were introduced after 1979. Whereas in 
earlier years nealy 85% of all formal (BNN) credit was allocated to 
export-crops, now the BND has raised the amount of credit directed 
towards basic grain production by 600% (compared to 1978). Also 
differential interest rates are introduced and credit, input provision 
and extension-policies are incorporated in a single organizational network-
(Procampo). 
For a review of Nicaraguan agricultural policy see: C D . Deere, 
"Nicaraguan agricultural policy: 1979-81", in Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 1981, Vol.5, and D. Kaimowitz & J.R. Thome, "Nicaragua's 
Agrarian Reform: the first year (1979-80), LTC paper 122, October 1980. 
- 20 -
However, the current credit-system suffers from shortcomings. In 
general, interest rates are too low (cannot cover the lending rate), 
leading to 'overfinancing' and consumptive use of the credit. Moreover, 
many bottlenecks exist in the systems for technical assistance, input-
provision and output-marketing, due to the limited bases for commercial 
production and problems with the development of infrastructure in the 
interior of the country . Finally, the total amount of credit is 
limited, whereby both export agriculture and food-producing sectors 
compete for the funds. 
The conclusion which can be drawn from the above exposition is that the 
problems of the Nicaraguan agricultural sector cannot be solved within 
the prevailing system. In the long run the agrarian transition policy 
has to include a conversion to other dynamic centres. The state sector (APP), 
the collective sector and small and medium farmers can take over a part 
of the surplus-generating capacity now almost exclusively in the hands 
of the landowner class. 
This means that the agrarian policy has to promote the development of new 
organization forms of production. To stimulate small peasant food 
production (which can become a major new accumulation basis) the improve-
ment of agricultural production conditions is important to increase 
agricultural productivity (and hence incomes) and to guarantee food 
self-sufficiency at reasonable prices 
The organization of cooperatives in all kinds of forms (including 'pooling') 
is extremely important to incorporate small peasants and semi-proletarians 
in the transition strategy, both in economie as well as in political 
respect. Cooperatives can be reached far more effectively by the state 
apparatus (access to credit provision, extension, etc.) and have a stronger 
power position vis-a-vis traditional middlemen (and also for protection 
against the state bureaucracy). Moreover, collectivization of agriculture 
is an important basis for the transition process, since transfers can be 
realized without excessive exploitation of the peasants. 
J. Wheelock, in : Ceres, op. cit., p.50. 
2) . . . 
within the framework of PAN (Programa Alimentario Nicaraguense), 
which is responsible for food distribution and price policy (executed 
by MICE). 
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Continuation 
In this report both the working papers and the reports of the discussions 
at the seminar are included. In an appendix, one can find some short 
notices about current research and cooperation projects with Nicaragua. 
The seminar has been concluded with a discussion about the possibilities 
for continuation of these kinds of interchange of views. The participants 
decided to start a permanent working on transition strategies in Central 
America, in which different research institutes will participate. By 
means of this organization, contacts will be maintained with Nicaraguan 
research institutes and some coordination between the different research 
projects will be accomplished. 
Amsterdam, March 1982 
Ruerd Ruben 
Correspondente 
Free University Amsterdam 
Faculty of Economics 
Department of Development and Agricultural Economics 
De Boelelaan 1105, room 4A-24 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Special thanks I owe to Wessel Eykman, Jan de Groot, Andre Klap, 
Roelien Kuil and Gerard van Westrienen,who made the reports. 
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SEMINAR ON NICARAGUA - V R I J E UNIVERSITEIT 
THE SEIZURE OF POWER IN NICARAGUA AND THE POLITICS 
OF THE S O C I A L I S T TRANSITION 
6 
The basic proposition of this paper is as follows. The 
decision to launch a 'transition' to socialism (or, as I 
prefer to put it, to initiate a process of building 
socialism) is a political one, its timing and nature, 
like those of all policy decisions, being determined by 
the balance of class and other social forces (conjunqjbion) 
at the particular point in time (conjuncture) when the 
decision is made. Particularly since the beginning of 
the building of socialism usually follows immediately 
upon the taking of state power (usually through violent 
revolution) by forces which intend to transform society 
or at least shortly thereafter, the political conjuftction 
at that conjunture will be largely determined by the 
circumstances in which power was won. Above all, the 
determinants will be firstly the composition of the 
revolutionary bloc formed in the course of the struggle 
for power, which may include a wide variety of social 
interests the only real common concern of which is 
destruction of the old regime, and secondly the nature 
of the leadership of the bloc (the vanguard). Once 
that concern has been met the other differences will 
emerge and have a profound effect upon the nature and 
timing of the launching of socialist policies. The 
developments in Nicaragua since July 1979 seem to me to 
provide a particularly clear example of this, and in 
this paper I wish to focus upon the struggle for power 
leading up to that date in order to establish what kind 
of revolutionary bloc was formed and how it overthrew 
the old regime, in my view indispensable concerns if we 
are to understand the attempted 'transition.' 
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Nicaragua as a Peripheral Capita list Formation 
This presentation takes it as basic that we may see 
Nicaragua as situated in a a capitalist world system9 
which had emerged in an almost complete form by 1914 and 
had continued to develop since then, notably by shifting 
since 194 5 from the old colony-metropolis relationship 
to one of hierarchies of sovereign states and supra-
national bodies. We may in fact hypothesise three basic 
historical forms in which such peripheral social forma-
tions have been integrated into that system. The obvious 
reservation must be made they are in no sense 'pure'/out 
overlap both in time and structually. 
The first, in f act., no longer really exists anywhere, 
since as a form it was associated with the phase of 
Western mercantile capitalism from the 15th to the late 
18th centuries? its typical expression was the trading 
fort or, at its most highly developed, the slave plantation. 
We would designate this form 'primitive integration.' 
The further development of Western capitalism, taking us 
into its manufacturing phase, with new and increased 
demands for raw materials, labour power, markets and 
investment outlets to ensure its accumulation and reproduction, 
brought with it the phase of %intermediate integration* 
of the peripheral formations, which at this point were 
increasingly being spatially reorganised for capialist 
purposes, sometimes involving the creation of units 
which never existed before (the colonies created by the 
'grab for Africa8, for example). This was typically a 
phase of investment for extraction, so that the major 
produtive enterprises of the form were plantations and 
mines, with peasant agriculture structured round these 
to provide subsistence for rural and urban labourers or 
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cash crops where capitalist accumulation found this more 
efficiënt (for instance, cocoa in the Gold Coast (Ghana)). 
Most recently, with manufacturing capitalism in its 
monopoly stage, we have entered a phase in which cases 
are emerging of 'advanced integration,' in,which direct 
capitalist production is spreading in the rural areas of 
the periphery and the manufacturing sector is growing 
and even becoming dominant: both phenomena are associated 
with the direct investment of capital by Western multinationals, 
sometimes in association with local capitalists. 
'Integration,' obviously the crucial variable for 
us, is here, then, the penetration of capitalism from its 
base in the advanced industrial countries in ever more 
massive and complex forms. At first sight it seems 
surprising that all the attempted socialist transformations 
have occurred in countries which are cases only of 
intermediate integration. (Two possible exceptions are 
Russia in 1917 and Cuba in the late 1950s, which might be 
argued to have been embarking on the transition towards 
advanced status, though still with faf to go.) On the 
other hand we have cases like Laos or Cambodia (Kampuchea), 
where the degree of even intermediate capitalist integration 
was low, and the generalisation is obviously valid. 
Above all advanced formations such as Brazil, Argentina 
and Taiwan have proved notoriously poor breeding grounds 
for successful socialist movements, and even those which 
seem to be blocked from making the full transition to 
advanced status, like Turkey, are very resistant. 
The impact of the gradual historica1 creation of 
the periphery (for such it was) upon class formation 
there was enormous. Old classes and strata were given 
new shapes, new ones created, but in no case did this 
exactly parallel the Western experience; we are now in 
the realm of 'underdevelopment'. Indeed, that is how 
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that phenomenon took its characteristic shape, an interpenetration 
and hybridisation of non-capitalist forms of production, 
distribution and exchange with capitalist modes, the 
latter of course dominant and determining (at least 
ultimately) the ability of the others to reproduce 
themselves. 
Forms and modes of production mean people in social 
relations with one another, and those relations structured 
into the regularities of classes and other social groups. 
Such relations in turn mean exploitation and oppression, 
contradictions and class struggle. It is my hypothesis 
that the interpenetration of forms and modes of production 
and consequent social structures and relations are most 
complex of all in the countries which are intermediately 
integrated into the world capitalist system. Nicaragua 
is a case in point, although due allowance must also be 
made for its specificities. 
The first necessary point, therefore, is that 
Nicaragua's colonial experience goes far back in time, 
to Spanish expansion in the sixteenth century, but 
conversely ended as part of the genera1 Latin American 
liberation struggle already in 1821. Spanish colonialism 
had resulted in little capitalist penetration, even of 
the mercantile kindi the dominant class after formal 
independence was gained was the cattle-raising landed 
oligarchy. Interest on the part of the advanced capitalist 
countries really began with the prospect of a canal 
through the Central American isthmus to link the east 
coast of the USA more readily with the new centre of 
investment, California and its gold, after 1849. In 
1967 the ÜS government imposed a treaty on Nicaragua, 
breaking a previous agreement with Britain that each 
would abstain from creating a sphere of influence, 
though the USA found it ultimately better to build its 
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canal in Panama, after sponsoring the secession of that 
country from Colombia in 1902. 
Nicaragua thus immediately provides two general 
points of interest for us. lts colonial experience by 
1979 was remote and not directly determinant; this is 
important because many 'socialist' seizures of power 
since 1945 have taken the form of anti-colonial struggles 
(Viet Nam up to 1954, Angola, South Yemen and so on), 
but obviously the almost complete disappearance of 
formal colonies has ended this phase. Future struggles 
will thus no longer take such a form, with important" 
implications for their ideological content. Secondly, 
as we shall see, from this very underdeveloped beginning 
Nicaragua continued to remain backward, even in terms of 
the intermediately integrated periphery, and thus poses 
in a particularly acute form the question, why a socialist 
seizure of power there of all places? 
Relatively late for Latin America, a Liberal regime 
representing commercially-oriented business interests as 
opposed to the landowners' Conservative party opened the 
country from 1893 to foreign capital. Some American and 
European (for example, German) investment in production 
2 foliowed, in timber, gold, coffee and bananas. The 
expropriations of peasants - particularly Indian 
communities - from their land and the growth in wage 
labour which foliowed were enough to add a dimension of 
popular resistance to the struggle between Liberals and 
Conservatives which included frequent resort to coups 
and resultant sporadic civil war. From 1912 onwards 
these provoked interventions by the US Marines, and this 
helped broaden a Liberal rebellion in 1926 into the 
3 
liberation war led by Augusto Cesar Sandino. The 
foreign troups were forced to withdraw in 1931, but they 
left behind the US-trained National Guard commanded by 
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Anastasio Somoza the elder, who in February 1933 treacherously 
murdered Sandino and his followers and inaugurated 
direct or indirect rule by the Somoza family for more 
than forty-five years. 
In these events we see confirmed the most basic 
characteristic of the underdeveloped periphery, the 
determinant influence of external forces in structuring 
its economy and thus in shaping its class formation and 
political struggle. Subsequent decades only confirmed 
and broadened this. The Second World War encouraged 
Nicaraguan production for export and establishment of 
some light industry to replace imports, in the 1950s the 
hunger of the capitalist world for raw materials gave a 
further spur to exports, and the formation of the Central 
American Common Market in 196 3 gave a wider market for a 
broadening of industry. Much of the last expansion was 
based on foreign capital and branch plantsj Westinghouse, 
US Steel, Esso Standard Oils, Panamerican World Airways, 
Monsanto Chemicals, General Mills, First National City 
Bank and many more became featured in the Nicaraguan 
register of companies. 
By the late 1970s the total foreign capital invested 
in Nicaragua is estimated at between $125 and $170 
5 
million, seventy to eighty percent of xt from the USA. 
This was not a particularly large concentration by world 
standards, even on the periphery, but it was sufficiënt 
to give structure to the whole social formation. Thus, 
foreign and local capitalists were grouped into three 
main constellations, one round the Somoza family, another 
round the Banco de America and the third based on the 
6 Banco Nicaraguense. The Somozas' holdings were by far 
the greatest, extending into every sector of the economy 
and totalling perhaps $400 million, This aspect of the 
power structure was unusual, and we must return to it 
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soon, but here let it be emphasised that it did not 
create a qualitative difference in the Nicaraguan situation 
compared to other formations of its kind. Typical 
enough, too, was the process of 'modernisation' through 
which the capitalist class had passed by virtue of its 
association with foreign enterprise and its increasing 
incorporation into wider regional and world markets. 
Nevertheless, it remained highly divided internally, 
among the usual sectors of finance, agriculture, industry, 
trade and so on and stratified by levels of wealth. 
Moreover, the strata tended to coincide with a segmentation 
determined by closeness of association with foreign ' 
capital? in particular, local small businessmen functióned 
without that support. 
At its lower, less affluent margins the capitalist 
class merged into the petty bourgeoisie of self-employed 
manufacturers and traders, widened in numbers in the. 
1960s as increased production spread its effects but 
struggling always for survival as they competed with 
foreign products, the capitalists above them, and one 
another. For the most part close to them in incomes and 
attitudes, but distinct in class terms, were the middle 
strata, at the top affluent professionals closer to the 
capitalists, then fading down through various grades of 
bureaucrats, teachers and clerks until one reacties 
genteel poverty and even worse. Distinguished from the 
petty bourgeoisie proper by the fact that they sold 
their labour power directly to live (in this resembling 
rather the working class), these strata had also proliferated 
in the sixties as the state apparatus grew and capitalism 
demanded even more services as it expanded its production 
7 
and marketing. By 1973 they together with the petty 
bourgeoisie totalled around a fifth of the 'economically 
active' population of 544,000 (in a population of just 
over two million). 
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Capitalism necessarily brings with it wage employment 
as it consolidates as a mode of production, cutting 
peasants from their land and petty producers from their 
crafts then buying their labour power when and how it 
pleases. In 1971 237,000 Nicaraguans were employed in 
agriculture, 109,000 of them wage labourers on the big 
farms, ranches and plantations. The development of 
industry on a capital intensive basis had raised the 
number of factory workers only from 6 2,000 in 1963 to 
75,000 in 1971. The working class was thus small andy 
largely rural (though transport, construction and some 
other sectors would have located some thousands more in 
the towns) . The rural centre of gravi'ty kept this class 
close to that of the nearly 130,000 independent peasant 
producers, indeed overlapping with it, since many combined 
occasional wage labour with a small plot of land or left 
the plot with their family and moved more permanently 
into wage work. The point is that there was neither 
enough land nor enough wage labour to give a livelihood 
to all; an official unemployment figure of 36 per cent 
in September 1973 reveals that there was every scope for 
capitalism to use its well-worn whip of worklessness to 
keep wages down f in 1971 fifty per cent of the population 
had an annual cash income of less than §90. This situation 
was made a permanent structural feature by the consolidation 
of export agriculture based on large holdings from the 
early 1950si by 1971 less than 2 per cent of these 
amassed almost 50 per cent of cultivated area, while the 
bottom 76 per cent of holdings accounted for 13 per 
cent. Migration to Managua and other towns created the 
shanty areas around them, filled with the unemployed and 
those who scratched a living by all conceivable - and 
some almost unimaginable - exercises of human ingenuity. 
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The above discussion has presented the situation in 
terms of one country of the capitalist periphery which 
has experienced a socialist revolution. What must 
be emphasised is that, despite obvious particularities 
of detail, the picture presented is typicar of the great 
majority of peripheral formations. In all of them the 
processes of class formation induced by many years of 
capitalist penetration are complex and the situation 
fluid; classes and strata are internally divided and 
overlap and interpenetrate one another, people move 
readily and frequently among them and simultaneously/' 
hold such dual class positions as poor peasant and rural 
wage worker. Contradictions among classes are multiple, 
and are supplemented and interpenetrated by others 
involved in the social relations of women, young people 
and minority ethnic or religious groups. All this is 
very far from the classical Marxist picture of polarisation 
and the growing size, solidity and self-consciousness of 
the working class. Yet, as we shall go on to show 
this class situation provides the basic reason why revolutions 
led by socialists take place in countries intermediately 
integrated into the capitalist periphery. Before this 
point can be fully consolidated, some more foundations 
must be laid. 
The building blocks for these are the concepts of 
the state and the power bloc. In the literature on 
underdevelopment the state has occupied a prominent 
place in recent years, as both Marxist and other writers 
have come to see it as playing a decisive interventionary 
role. Both have therefore spoken of the 'autonomous' or 
at least 'semi-autonomous' state, acting as an independent 
force 'above' class or other social interests because 
its perspectives are wider and its resources much greater 
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than theirs. The problem is that such an approach 
tends to personify the state as if it were a 
sort of conscious force in itself, or at least as if it 
were the expression of some group (the military?) who 
could transcend class interests. 
The challenge, then, is to find a different mode of 
analysis. In attempting this, let it immediately be 
clear that we would not suggest some neutral role for 
the state apparatus, Evidently there are such things as 
dominant classes which have a disproportionate share of 
economie and political power and hence much freer access 
to the state and the ability to direct policy in their 
own favour. But to speak of them as fdominant1 is less 
misleading than to use the more time-honoured expressions, 
'ruling1 or 'governing,1 which again imply too direct a 
relationship to the state apparatus. Even in the 'advanced 
capitalist countries the position is more complex, 
though the constellation of bankers, other businessmen 
and corporation lawyers calied in to hold the government 
portfolios under any US President would appear to give a 
rather old-fashioned Marxism a new lease of life. In 
the capitalist periphery, where the historical origins 
and formation of the state are different, the relationship 
of the dominant classes to the state apparatus is certainly 
more nuanced, mediated by a power bloc which gives a 
particular shape to that relationship. 
The origins of the state apparatus in the capitalist 
periphery are basically colonial, or where they are not 
(in Thailand or Turkey, for example) are to be found in 
a conscious attempt to 'modernize' on a European model. 
(Latin American states are both, being 'modernizations' 
of very old colonial structures.) This means that these 
states were essentially imports. They evolved only 
partially organically - better* dialectically - with the 
- 33 -
internal class struggle, as did those of Western Europe. 
Basically, rather, they were inserted into it by the 
conscious act of colonial masters or local modernizers 
and immediately became a factor of great influence on 
the new patterns of class formation which had foliowed 
capitalist penetration. The local dominant class (or 
classes) thus operated through a state apparatus which 
from its origins had assumed a quite different posture, 
as it were, towards such local classes, relating to them 
not directly but with the mediation of a power bloc 
composed of those elements most directly associated with 
'decolonisation' or 'modernisation' of the state apparatus. 
Thus in Nicaragua, the colonialiy-rooted state 
which was in effect 'modernized' under the direct auspices 
of the USA between 1912 and 1931 (mainly by giving it 
an effective repressive apparatus, centred on the new 
National Guard) was permeated from its beginning by 
Somoza family interests. As one commentator put it, by 
the 1970s the National Guard and the younger Anastasio 
Somoza's 'gigantic network of economie and political 
dependents and his direct partners* were 'intertwined 
with the very foundations of the state'. This situation 
in turn created a very important contradiction between 
the state apparatus and the (economically) dominant 
capitalist class, to which the Somoza family of course 
belonged. The state served to secure the necessary 
conditions for the capitalists in genera1 to accumulate, 
primarily through the repression of the exploitéd classes 
and groups. On the other hand, 'Since he holds the 
state apparatus in his hands, Somoza always alters the 
9 
rules of the economxc game in his favour.' 
In pre-revolution Nicaragua the power bloc thus had 
one very special - though by no means unique - feature, 
the presence at its centre of the Somoza family, which 
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gave it a particular coherence. Beyond them were their 
immediate business associates, top officers of the 
National Guard, certain leading bureaucrats (though some 
of these were also extended family members, lik® the 
head of the National Power Co» and the National Developmènt 
Institute) and, until the mid~1970s, the Banco Nicaraguense 
group. It could well be argued that successive ÜS ambassadors 
also directly belonged to the bloc, since they gave 
advice on a virtually day-to~day basis. Obvioüsly the 
way in which policies were formulated and executed wete, 
mediated and determined by the composition of the bloc» 
and conversely not to belong or to have direct ehtry waê 
a manifest disadvantage. 
The Somozist state apparatus was thus not some 
semi-autonomous entity. Indeed, quite the reverse, it 
was very firmly in the grip of a minority even of thé 
dominant capitalist class, and any apparent freedom of 
action which it might have was precisely a result of 
counter-pressures by a variety of complex contrmdictions 
(such as Somoza group v. other capitalists, forêifn v. 
national business, big businessmen v„ small) , not of an 
absence of such direct determinations. This loeation of 
the state apparatus and power bloc awong multiple coftfcjfa" 
dictions on the capitalist periphery provides u® with, the 
second main reason why revolutions led by socialist® 
take place in countries intermediately inteyat®d into it. 
Class Struggle on the Periphery 
If contemporary peripheral formations such as Nicaragua 
are characterised by complex class structures with 
multiple contradictions which interpenetrate one another, 
then it follows that the class struggle there must be 
equally complex. In other words, there is a nmïtipliéity 
of interests, those of classes, of groupings of variöus 
kinds within classes, and of social groups not defiïitble 
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as classes (women, youth, ethnic minorities), which in 
some degree or other are organised and self-conscious 
and attempting to maximise advantages in the case of the 
relatively privileged and win something for themselves 
in the case of the subordinated. Moreover4 all of this 
is occurring in situations where external relations in 
particular, along with a relatively low development of 
productive forces linked with those relations, make the 
pool of locally-held resources for which to compete 
quite small. In certain circumstances (and quite quickly, 
as we shall argue) the competition becomes one not just 
for available resources but for state power in general. 
To reach that level the system must be passing into a 
condition of crisis. It is our next task, therefore, to 
look at class struggle in relation to the socialist 
seizure of power. 
Already during the 19 20s, Marxist-Leninist theory, 
more especially in its Stalinist formulation, had established 
that it was not the workers alone upon whom the revolution 
would rest but rather that in the conditions of peripheral 
capitalism a broader range of class elements must be 
brought together. This was realistic, but also in our 
opinion decisive for the future 'socialist' seizures of 
power. To formulate a proposition in line with our 
previous analysis: in the class conditions of peripheral 
capitalism, the only possible revolutionary bloc is one which 
includes all dissident class and other elements. 
At this point it seems better immediately to raise 
three problems for the organisation of class struggle 
which follow directly from the above proposition. 
Firstly, the need to combine a wide variety of alienated 
elements into one movement means finding suitable forms 
of organisation. The Indochinese Communist Party is a 
good example here: claiming in May 1941 that a quarter 
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of its members were workers, at the same time it launched 
an extensive programme of building up 'National Salvation9 
organisations for peasants, intellectualsf wom®n# stüdents, 
soldiers and other interests» In these ciroumstances 
Communist Parties became both vanguards of the proletariat 
at the head of the revolution and the scaffolding which 
held together an edifice of bodies which they had th«mselves 
often created. 
Similarly, and a second problem which follows from 
the heterogeneous composition of the bloc upon which ^he 
party8s seizure of power must be based„ preserving th© 
purity of a 'proletarian8 ideology mignt well also prov® 
difficult. Ernesto Laclau has argued (though bssically 
in the context of developed capitalisms) that the most 
appropriate counter to the power bloc is 'the people' 
11 
and a !popular-democratics ideology. Certainly in the 
countries of the capitalist periphery some sort of 
formulation of this kind - not directly related to cl&ss 
interests but rather cutting across them - has been 
common. Often we find a sort of petty bourgeois or 
peasant Jacobinism, a radicalism of small property whèn 
counterposed to large* democratie and egalitarian rather 
than specifically socialist. 
Most important of -all has probably been the foreê 
of nationalism* at least in those cases where the soeifclist 
revolution has been intertwined with anti-colonial 
revolt or resistance to a foreign invader* as in Yugoèlavia 
in the Second World War. Thus in Nicaragua th® tmird«r®d 
Sandino became the central symbol of resistanc® ag&inst 
not only the Somozas but their North American patrons» 
The main point here is the contradiction involv®d 
in this sort of ideological situations nationalism or 
some sort of populist Jacobinism may permit th® broad«st 
possible rallying of strength to the revolution led by 
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socialists, but conversely make the shift to an overt 
class struggle position that much more difficult at a 
later stage. Assuming that such a shift must occur, 
whether we postulate clearly discernible stages or 
stress a 'permanent revolution* with a rapid escalation 
(and change in forms of struggle), the implication is 
that after state power has been seized there will be a 
struggle among the various class and other elements in 
the original bloc, since their interests as such will 
not necessarily be compatible with socialist policies. 
This issue of ideology as an expression of class/social 
group interest or of that of some wider and less materially-based 
category ('nation,' 'people') is closely bound up with 
the role in the revolutionary bloc of middle strata 
elements. Ever since Lenin's formulation in 'What Is To 
Be Done?' (1902) that Marxism must be brought to the 
proletariat from 'outside' by the vanguard party, debate 
has raged as to whether or not this represented in fact 
an imposition of non-proletarian leadership. Certainly, 
whether we look at the Russian case or any of its successors, 
we see that predominantly middle strata intellectuals 
have been the main 'bearers' of socialist doctrine on 
the periphery. Most important of all, they have been the 
often self-appointed vanguard. 
Vanguard Party and Revolutionary Bloc 
A basic received idea which has been passed down through 
the mainstream of socialist thought is that of the 
vanguard party, which would lead the proletariat, itself 
the dominant partner in a worker-peasant alliance, 
around which would in turn be built a broader bloc of 
classes. The point is that the doctrine of the vanguard 
party, has consistently appeared to meet a real need, 
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namely that of taking an initiative and actively seeking 
to build the opposition bloc which would give a basé and 
weight to the revolution. The real need arises from the 
breadth and heterogeneity of such a bloc in the typical 
situation of social struggle found on the periphery. 
Given this situation, leadership in building the necessary 
alliances has to come from somewhere, and given the 
difficulties which various subordinated classes and 
groups face in developing their own organic intellectuals, 
the chances are great that that leadership will come 
from outside them. The concept of the vanguard party' 
can serve as the crucial ideological instrument for the 
crystallisation of the group of leaders, and the party 
itself as the necessary organisational vehicle for them 
to assert their dominance. However, the group of leaders 
does not always emerge as a fully-fledged vanguard party 
with the unity and !iron discipline' beloved of the 
Stalinist Comintern. In one important case, Cuba, and 
more recently in Nicaragua, an organised but looser 
grouping has emerged to take the lead (the 26th July 
Movement and the Sandinist National Liberation Front). 
Two last points may be made about the revolutionary 
bloc. It is extremely important to note that, the 
hegemony which is achieved within the bloc is not that 
of the working class, but of the party/movement, which 
means of its leadership, which we have already notfed is 
usually not itself working class in origin. Constant 
repetition of the assertion that the party is th® van#tt«d 
of the working class is not sufficiënt to prove that it 
is truly the latter which is hegemonie. How might th&t 
have been achieved in Nicaragua in the late 1970s, with 
a small, heterogeneous working class less than 6 percèftt 
12 
of which was even unionised? What is supposed to be 
the content of that hegemony - the acceptance of workeirs* 
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special interests as the interests of all, or a broader 
commitment to a socialist future? One reason why the 
leaders of the party/movement impose its hegemony within 
the revolutionary bloc is certainly because the working 
class is not able to do so. 
A second dimension of the problem of integrating 
the bloc is that, given its heterogeneity, this cannot 
in fact be done on the basis of class and other group 
interests, since these are very different and sometimes 
actually opposed. Moreover, it is difficult to see how 
any of them could lead directly to socialism except the 
interest of the working class, consciousness of which we 
have already noted is not (and cannot be) sufficiently 
developed to make its own interest hegemonie. 
On the basis of this theorisation it becomes easy 
to see why a revolutionary leadership of a socialist 
kind would find it unable to bind together a revolutionary 
bloc on a basis of class interest. Even if all were 
compatible (and the bloc may well contain capitalists 
and even landlords, as in China and Viet Nam), the great 
majority are not generalisable into an ideological 
stance directed towards social transformation. The 
result is that a programme of specific demands may be 
put together to cover all elements in one way or another, 
but that the generalised ideology has to take a non-class 
form, a rather unspecific populism, or nationalism 
expressed as general liberation. 
Crisis of the Regime 
We have now moved close to the final act of the 
seizure of power, the battering down of the gates of the 
presidential palace, the actual taking control of the 
state apparatus. We must therefore turn our attention 
to the way in which peripheral regimes finally collapse 
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accumulation based on realisation of the surplus value 
generated from their raw materials and by their labour 
power is located in the advanced industrial countries, 
rather than locally; this leaves thera constantly short 
of investment funds. The result is that they cannot 
produce what they need themselves and therefore have to 
import it; this means that price inflation is passed 
back to them whenever they buy indispensable food, 
machinery and oil (except for the fortunate few who 
produce the last themselves and they are not immune to 
the other price rises, only better cushioned). In order 
to buy imports and pay other rising costs the power bloc 
must find funds in the situation of low levels of local 
accumulation, and hence runs into a variant of the 
'fiscal crisis of the state' which in the 1970s came 
increasingly to characterise advanced capitalist formations 
also. Resort is usually had to borrowing abroad, from 
governments, international agencies and, increasingly in 
the '70s, private banks. Huge debts which cannot be 
paid in time and have to be covered by further borrowings 
(the 'debt trap') are the result. Lastly, what surplus 
can be realised locally is used to maintain the dominant 
class and its state apparatus, perpetuating the very 
unequal income distribution among different classes and 
groups. 
All this would certainly seem to add up to a condition 
of permanent economie crisis, which may indeed grow 
worse, but then often because of political factors; 
thus, capital may be sent away in the face of mounting 
popular pressure, as in early September 1978 in Nicaragua, 
when US$30,000,000 was reported to have been withdrawn 
13 from the banks. This implies a complex relationship 
between the economie and political aspects of regime 
crisis. 
- i+2 -
The way in which the political crisis of the regime 
develops can be seen most concretely by looking at the 
Nicaraguan case. There the opposition to the Somoza 
regime had a long lineage, going back indeed to Sandino, 
whose mantle the Sandinist Front for National Liberation 
(FSLN) was to assume publicly in 1962. The Front was 
born out of the failure of the Moscow-aligned Nicaraguan 
Socialist Party (PSN) to assume the revolutionary leadership; 
indeed it had at times worked with the regime. This 
shift in leadership to another vanguard was of great 
significance, since it meant the picking up of the 
inheritance of the Comintern but without the full range 
of ideological and moral commitments or the enforced 
unity of traditional Communist Parties. (This may well 
typify future cases.) A substantial part of the leadership 
of the FSLN was drawn from dissident members of the PSN. 
The immediate background to the formation of the Front 
was the failure of various risings against Somozist 
rule, partly led by old-time Sandinists partly by disenchanted 
capitalist and middle strata elementsj these attempts 
14 tended to have a distinct 'foco' character. For more 
than ten years, however, the FSLN fared no better, 
finding no real point of entry into the class struggle 
from which it could bui ld an effective revolutionary 
bloc. In this period the original leaders were almost 
all killed. 
In December 197 3 the devastation of the Managua 
earthquake did cause a quantum leap in the misery of the 
biggest agglomeration of the urban poor, at a time when 
the 'molecular' effects of a rising cost of living had 
already begun to provoke strikes and demonstrations. 
Also significant was the immediate political impact and 
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the effect of the earthquake's aftermath on the attitudes 
of elements of the more affluent. First of all, the 
state apparatus was shown in the days following the 
disaster to be weaker than it appeared, when the National 
Guard turned to looting rather than preventing it and a 
force of US Marines from the Panama Canal Zone in fact 
15 kept what order was possible. Secondly, in the longer 
term, the Somocist core of the power bloc and its immediate 
associates took the opportunity for even more blatant 
graft and advantage-grabbing than usual, and failed to 
give equal access to other members. When Somoza rigged 
yet another election in September 1974 some of the most 
prominent capitalists took the lead in forming the 
Democratie Union for Liberation (UDEL) in December to 
16 
oppose the regime. With this failure of the old, 
almost ritualistic divisions between Liberals and Conservatives 
to contain any longer the fissures within the capitalist 
class, and with the solidarity of the power bloc even 
beginning to weaken, a central element in the kind of 
regime crisis with which we are concerned was introduced. 
Dissident capitalist elements, however, were moving 
before the socialist leaders could. The PSN, by now 
firmly committed to the strategy of aiming for the 
"bourgeois democratie revolution' first, joined the 
UDEL. For its part, the FSLN had not yet found its 
proper point of insertion into the class struggle, let 
alone become the hegemonie force in an opposition bloc. 
In the same month that the UDEL was formed the Front 
forced the release of some of its imprisoned members by 
a dramatic seizure of hostages, but this led to martial 
law and a state of siege being imposed until September 
1977. In the interim the Front came under heavier 
pressure (in this period the last original leader, 
Carlos Fonseca Amador, was killed). The leadership was 
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new and untried and now split into three groups, with 
different views on appropriate strategy. The 'Proletarian' 
faction maintained that, rather than guerrilla warfare, 
political work among the masses was necessary to build 
up the base for a vanguard party. The 'prolonged people's 
war' group were for a rural guerrilla strategy. The 
'terceristas' (literally 'thirdists,' i.e., holding a 
third position) favoured attempting an urban armed 
uprising backed by columns coming from the rural areas, 
with the necessary political preparation. In the end 
the seizure indeed took this form, and may represent 
another 'wave of the future'. 
In the meantime the urban and rural poor were not 
waiting. A wave of disturbances in 1976 was suppressed, 
then in September 1977 President Soraoza suffered a heart 
attack and this reminder of mortality inspired further 
resistance. There were strikes, by Managua transport 
workers for example, student demonstrations, and unrest 
among peasants whose spokespersons were being arrested 
or simply disappearing. This activity was not enough, 
however, to support the genera1 uprising which the 
terceristas sought, and FSLN guerrilla actions failed. 
Initiative again passed to dissident capitalist and 
middle strata elements, with the formation at the end of 
1977 of the Democratie National Movement (MDN) by the 
'Group of Twelve'; the 'tercerista' faction of the FSLN 
joined, thus beginning to move towards a broad opposition 
bloc in which socialist ideology would obviously have 
17 little part. 
In January 1978 Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of 
the largest newspaper and leading light of the UDEL, was 
murdered by a power bloc which was obviously becoming 
incautious under pressure. This gave the signal for 
another mass upsurge, but affected other class levels 
- 45 -
too. The death of worker and peasant activists was one 
thing, but, as Batista in Cuba had also discovered, once 
regime-inspired killings move up the social scale middle 
strata, petty bourgeois and even capitalist support 
begins to drop off and important elements begin to 
wonder whether their real future is with the existing 
power bloc. Somoza had always played the game of bourgeois 
democracy with cynicism as the thinnest cover for his 
own power, but he had played it; now even the cynicism 
was being displaced by his more basic vengefulness. 
More fundamentally, the power bloc could only hold on'by 
increased violence. The result was tbat the 'bourgeois 
democratie' opposition began to grow in strength, and it 
was they, rather than the PSN or FSLN, who now used the 
weapon of withdrawal of labour, locking out their employees 
and paying them not to work. 
When the popular upsurge died away or was actively 
crushed in the first months of 1978 the various FSLN 
factions were still left debating what strategy to 
follow. Thus the 'proletarian' group had continued to 
hold throughout 1977 that 'the fundamental conflict in 
the country is the class struggle of the proletariat 
against the bourgeoisie and its political system' and to 
assign 'only a complementary and secondary importance' 
18 to other struggles. The 'terceristas,' who were in a 
majority, in the aftermath of the struggle in early 1978 
spoke rather of a convergence of FSLN strategy and that 
of 'other political forces' on 'one immediate objective -
overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship', with the goal 'a 
democratie people's government, which will open the way 
for the development of the Sandinista People's Revolution'. 
In terms of immediate goals the 'proletarians' were not 
so far from this position, in fact (the 'prolonged 
people's war' group was effectively out of the debate), 
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since they were calling for 'a people's government, 
including representatives of the workers, peasants, 
students, and progressive intellectuals, in which every 
democratie stratum of the population would have the 
20 * 
right to representation'. A common ideological position 
was thus being created which would permit the PSLN as a 
whole to take the lead as a vanguard movement (though 
not as a tightly-knit party) in a revolutionary bloc of 
a wide variety of class and other dissident elements. 
Again, this is likely to characterise future cases. 
One of the special elements in Nicaragua was thé 
Indian communities which in Monimbo and Diriamba had 
risen in desperate insurrection as the lockout began to 
21 faxl and been crushed. It was now becoming evident to 
more and more sections of the population that only a 
general uprising including armed force could destroy the 
power bloc and seize the state apparatus, and so they 
turned to the FSLN, which stepped up its guerrilla 
activities in the first half of 1978,.and during those 
months can be said finally to have found its point of 
entry. The Front was able to spread and consolidate its 
network of basic organisations for workers, peasants and 
rural labourers, women and others, and also the key 
Civil Defence Committees in the urban shanty towns. In 
July 1978 these were Consolidated by the formation of 
the United People's Movement (MPÜ), which also brought 
in one faction of the now divided PSN. At the same 
time, however, another faction had joined the Broad 
Opposition Front (FAO), formed by the capitalist and 
middle strata opponents of the regime and including even 
the Conservatives who had been Soraoza's ritual adversaries. 
Membership also included 'the Twelve,8 a group of liberal 
capitalist and upper middle stratum personalities through 
whom the FSLN had a voice in the FAO. In this very 
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limited sense, therefore, a broad revolutionary bloc had 
been formed, composed of all those who wanted to destroy 
the regime. * 
That had still to be accomplished, and by mid-1978 
Somoza was again receiving financial and other support 
from the Carter administration in the USA, which had 
flinched when its trumpeted dedication to 'human rights• 
had so obviously struck no resonance in the Somocist 
power bloc. That constellation needed the support, 
since in July the FSLN stepped up its armed action, 
which found the most dramatic expression in the seizure 
of the legislature in August and the use of hostages to 
22 force release of prisoners. Ultimately more important, 
however, was the growing mass movement behind such 
actions. With strikes already breaking out, the employers 
began another lockout, which by early September had 
brought some eighty per cent of workers into paid inactivity. 
There were major uprisings to support the FSLN in five 
provincial eentres, and armed columns entered from Costa 
Rica to create rural bases. 
Yet the regime did not crumble. The heroism of the 
shanty town populations whom bourgeois theory dismisses 
as 'marginals' could not in the end triumph against the 
weaponry which the power bloc could obtain from the USA 
and other parts of the Free World. On another level, 
though the form for the seizure of power was now generally 
understood by the various elements in the revolutionary 
bloc, namely armed insurrection, the exact form in which 
that seizure would be immediately consolidated was not 
at all clear. By virtue of its links to the FAO the FSLN 
(or at least its 'tercerista' majority) spoke of a 
government to be formed by the dignitaries of 'the 
Twelve,' but gave no clearer picture. The FAO itself 
spoke with more assurance. In October it put forward a ; 
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16-point programme demanding the departure of the Somozas 
from the country and formation of a national government; 
a place was open in this for the power bloc's own Liberal 
Party if it repented, and the National Guard would 
remain, though reorganised by 'officers of* recognized 
23 good conduct and discipline*. It was evident that 
those elements of the dominant class now in opposition 
had very definite ideas on what would constitute a 
reliable new power bloc and had no wish to lose the 
essential parts of the old state apparatus. 
The Somoza regime did not crumble in August and 
September 1978, but it began to crack, and most significantly 
in terms of its coercive arm. The widespread deployment 
of National Guard officers to various branches had 
militarised the state apparatus and excluded other 
middle strata and capitalist elements from the opportunities 
such access gave. As the regime came increasingly to 
depend on coercion the Guard more and more assumed the 
role of holding it together. But during the new confrontation 
Somoza found it necessary to turn on his own kind; the 
leadership of the elite 'Black Berets' was eliminated 
and nearly a hundred other officers arrested on charges 
of plotting. 
The regime was in fact deep in political crisis by 
late 1978. Whatever difference a credit of $12,000,000 
from the US government and loans totallying $150,000,000 
from ÜS private banksf arranged in May and August 1978, 
might make to the economie situation, that was an inescapable 
fact. Substantial parts of the dominant class no longer 
trusted the Somoza power bloc to protect their interests, 
rather feared an active discrimination against them, and 
their solution was to form the bloc again, with a composition 
which would direct the state apparatus in another way. 
The power bloc itself was uncertain and internally 
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divided, its members ready to sacrifice one another if 
that would ensure power. The support which minimally 
any power bloc and dominant class must have from subordinate 
classes and groups was" largely gone, finally dissipated 
by gr eed and brutality become too obvious for* any false 
explanation. Peasants, workers, women, Indians, students 
and the whole range of the urban poor were now ready to 
domonstrate, strike, fight or at least support the 
fighters, and the capacity of the state apparatus to 
coerce was slowly dwindling. All that remained to complete 
the political crisis was the full and confident counter-position 
of an opposition bloc. 
It is one of the points of interest of the Nicaraguan 
case that such a move came so late. Though it can be 
said that by the first half of 1978 the FSLN could never 
be wiped out, it was still only then finding its point 
of entry into the class struggle and it was by no means 
the hegemonie force in a complete bloc of dissident 
elements. If anything, the formation of the FAO, which 
even had trade union support, meant the existence of two 
such bloes. Yet, in the conditions of class struggle in 
Nicaragua, a bloc formed only of workers, peasants and 
the other poor, as the FSLN 'proletarian' faction wished 
originally, was most unlikely to have sufficiënt weight, 
and certainly not brought quickly into play. Radical 
Catholics and the PSN had influence in the unions, in 
any case small, and among peasants, and leaned to the 
FAO; it must be repeated that the withdrawals of labour 
in early 1978 and again in September-October were paid 
lockouts, not strikes. In the end the FSLN was enough 
of a vanguard, the valour of its members and supporters 
suprème enough, to lead the final thrust. 
Early in December 1978 the three FSLN factions 
finally united formally in support of the MSÜ. In doing 
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so they headed off a political manoeuvre by the wealthiest 
elements in the FAO, those grouped round the Banco de 
America and Banco Nicaraguense, who were trying to use 
mediation by the US government to ensure the Somoza 
family's withdrawal under cover of a plebiscite and 
24 their ovm place in a new power bloc. It was at this 
point that the FSLN can be said to have taken control of 
the war of manoeuvre, politically now as well as militarily. 
The FAO disintegrated as most of its members repudiated 
the mediation tactic, and at the beginning of February 
1979 a pact was signed by the MPU, the Twelve, part of 
the Liberal Party, left Catholics and two labour organisations 
to establish the National Patriotic Front (FPN); ultimately 
all but the biggest capitalists adhered to its three 
main points - disbandment of the National Guard, nationalisation 
of Somoza family property and a democratie national 
government. It was in this very broad form that the 
FSLN secured its ideological hegemony. 
By the time the FPN was formed, and the broad 
revolutionary bloc finally Consolidated, economie crisis 
had come into conjunction with political. Somocist 
policy of making a desert in order to call it peace had 
destroyed many productive enterprises, so that together 
with the general disruption this had resulted in a 
negative growth rate for the economy in 1978. Inflation 
was raging and unemployment growing and by now the 
structural safety valves of peripheral economies which 
we noted earlier could not work sufficiently to counteract 
them. Moreover, the regime had lost the confidence of 
international capital. Arms could still be had from 
Israël, if not directly from the USA, but the International 
Monetary Fund refused more loans. In this situation the 
FSLN feit it could launch its last manoeuvre in the 
seizure of power. In a new wave of combined political 
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and military action in June and July 1979 the major 
provincial towns feil to it and Somoza threw in the 
towel and fled abroad. Yet even then the metaphorical 
entry through the gates of the presidential palace was a 
qualified triumph for the vanguard. In a la'st flurry of 
negotiation the biggest capitalists almost succeded, in 
conjunction with the ÜS government, in getting rid of 
the Somoza group but keeping the Liberal Party and a 
purged National Guard. This failed, but the capitalist 
interests were still there, and they had reason to 
believe they might still have access to the new power 
bloc, membership of which the FSLN leaders were forced 
to share with their very broad range of partners in the 
revolutionary bloc. Thus, in the new provisional council 
of ministers the portfolio for economics went to a 
former Secretary-General of the Central American Common 
Market and that for finance to an associate of the Banco 
de America group. 
The socialist-inspired vanguard had finally come to 
power, but in very particular circumstances in terms of 
the subsequent launching of policies directed towards a 
socialist transformation. The FSLN stood at the head of 
a revolutionary bloc which had finally been formed very 
late in the struggle and contained class elements which 
were anything but inclined to socialism. It follows 
from this that the organisatlon which gave structure and 
cohesion to the bloc was minimal, basically only an 
umbrella under which anyone who wanted to be out of the 
Somocist storm could shelter. Similarly, the common 
ideological position of the bloc had to be broad and 
vague - and hence minimal - enough to satisfy all elements. 
Last, but by no means least, the circumstances in which 
the bloc had finally been formed left it open to the 
anti-socialist elements to claim that they had been 
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given either explicit or implicit assurances by the 
Front that their economie positions would be assured 
after victory. The way was open for a very complex 
political situation to emerge at the conjuncture when 
the Sandinist leaders judged it opportune to begin to 
put forward an explicitly socialist line. 
Ken Post 
Institute of Social Studies 
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General 
1.1 These notes are no more than 'paragraph 
headings1, and not a complete treatment or paper. 
Their structure reflects the way in which the 
'transition debate' is now being carried on in 
Nicaragua as well as my own (academie) viewpoint. 
This debate is obviously influenced by the 
development of events themselves, not just 
prescriptive principles. 
1.2 Lt should bc reiriembernd that the nature of 
transition is not determined in Nicaragua, nor 
even within Central-, America; US intervention a 
decisive factor (as in Cuba), and thus 'defense 
of the revolution' itself may become an over-riding 
and distorting factor in transition. 
.1.3 I r;hall not at tempt to define 'transition to 
socialism', particularly since Nicaragua attempts 
to build a new kind of democratie socialism. Note 
since 1950, attempts at construction of socialism 
have taken place in small, open , highly dependant, 
export-agriculture economices (Cuba, Mozambique, 
Viet Nam etc) with special conditions of integration 
to world economy, large peasant sector, etc ( see 
special 1981 issue of World Development on this), 
so that relations of exchange are as important as 
those of production. 
1-4 Special history of Nicaragua (Sandino, Somoza, USA) 
and FSLN (tong guerilla war, work with popular organi-
sations at grass roots, manyuprising, tactical allian-
ces^etc) conductive to strong anti-imperialism (from 
whatever source) and determination to achieve popular 
deraocracy. 
T fan si Li (in JJo] >a L C2_ 
2.1 First plan (Programa de Reactivación en Beneficio 
del Pueblo, 1980) identifies the immediate aims of 
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the new 'transition economy' as being 
a) reactivation of the war-torn economy, satisfying 
the basic needs of the 'people of Sandino' 
b) advancc towards economie independence; 
c) start a process of accumulation and economie 
restructuring and 'initiate the transition to the 
New Economy' (ie, socialism) 
The new economy not clearly defined, initially, 
except that must ( p 80) 'permit a just, free and 
fraternal human life', 'democratization of the 
state apparatus' , increasing popular participation' 
the 'building not only of a New Economy but also 
of a 'New Man'. By 1981 (Programa de Austeridad y 
Eficiencia, 1981) objectives and problems had become 
clearer} niture of the 'mixed economy' began to be 
outlined, agrarian reform gradually defined, 
conflicts of consumption and accumulation and/or 
economie stability apparent, etc. Despite problems 
debate goes on. 
2.2 The debate itself takes place around specific issues 
(such as agrarian reform) rather than in general 
'ideological terms', partly because of a lack of 
tradition of 'intellectual' or 'platform politics' 
but: mainly because of shared aims and recognised 
obstacles. The main objectives (mixed economy, 
popular participation, non-aligned international 
position, agrarian development etc) long since 
agreed upon , it is the 'path' that is under dis-
cussion. A lot has been learned from other 
experiences such as Chile and Cuba - mainly of 
things to avoid, such as inflation and excessive 
public ownership. 
3. Development of the Economy 
3.1 Destruction and (more importantly) dislocation of 
war mainly past, but difficulty of regaining former 
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levels of production underlines need for structural 
change;economy inadequate for new national needs 
(basic consumption) and international circumstances 
(collapse of Central American Common Market); 
period of massive, foreign financial assistance 
closing; sucess with literacy, health, foodcrops 
points way to popular mobilization around production 
of basic needs. 
3.2 Economie debate centres around balance between the 
1three sectors' (Kalecki) 
A) means of production (capital growth, production 
inputs, energy,(construction materials) which are 
mainly imported and thus must be paid for by (mainly 
agrarian) exports produced by APP and private 
sector, marketed by APP). 
B) non-basic consumption (manufactured goods, services 
o1:c) which is foroign-oxchangc intensive nnd concen-
trated in top quartile of population produced in 
the 'capitalist' (including APP) sector; 
C) basic needs (food, health, education, housing, 
public transport, clothing) produced by peasants, 
popular movements and government. 
Obvious implication.s for incomë distribution in the 
balance between consumption and accumulation 
(including closing external qep ) on the one hand 
(A versus B and to some extent C) and between different 
income groups (B versus C and country versus towns) 
on the other, of different sectoral balances. 
3.3 Desire to avoid Cuban experience of capital-intensive 
welfare which prevent} productive accumulation and 
limits popular participation, plus obvious limitations 
of executive capacity of the state and size of 
peasant economy, lead to decentralization of basic 
needs provision (C); this will be permanent feature 
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of transition. Limitations of exports in medium 
term (exhausted mines, renovation of coffee, cotton 
ecology), new projects take time, pressure of internal 
consumption (sugar, timber, meat, fish, milk), 
deteriorating external terms of trade make invest-
ment in export sectors urgent but costly, only APP 
able and willing to carry this out. Non-basic 
consumption should be reduced as part of income-
redistribution strategy, but this meets middle-class 
resistence (and Nicaragua cannot afford to lose 
technicians) and even affects urban proletariat 
(small but socially important). Realisation that 
economy will not return to former output of producti-
vity without structural change makes more urgent and 
more conflictive. 
Economie organization of state sector in central 
transition theme. Shift from ideas of central 
planning towards 'célculo económico' in 1980/81; 
use of banking system for information and control; 
need to maintain macroeconomic stability to 
present speculation and destabilization forces tax 
reform, APP surplusus (where possible) , limited 
welfare budget (reinforcing popular mobilisation); 
constant awareness of executive limitation of 
state itself (experience of three years of APP); 
repe'ated efforts to control bureaucratie expansion. 
Mobilization of surplus not to be based on internal 
terms of trade (peasants, artisans) as against 
income-distribution objectives (poorest) and anyway 
ineffective because foreign exchange is needed for 
accumulation; thus raising labour productivity in 
'modern' sector the only way. Industrialization 
limited by present inadequate base, small market, 
collapse of Central American Common Market. Thus 
accumulation to centre on agriculture, producer of 
exports (Sector A) and wagegoods (Sector B); manufactu-
ring in support of agriculture, basic needs (textiles, 
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construction materials); urgent need for 
domestic energy supply (hydro, geothermal) 
to reduce on dependency. Possibilities in 
timber, mining, fishing; but with limited 
coffee and cotton, expansion in sugar and 
livestock at Nicaragua is essentially a land-
surplus labour-short economy. 
Social Reform 
4.1 Four forms of production' exist: 
a) state modern-sector enterprise (export agricul-
ture, industry, foreign trade, banking, Wholesale 
trade, public transport, energy, etc). 
b) private capitalist producers and merchants 
c) cooperative's of production and services 
d) petty producers and traders (peasants, 
artisans, retail shops, etc). 
Present balance of output and employment is 
approximately as follows (in 1981): 
Production (GDP) Employment (EAP) 
A . P . P . & 3 4 % - 2 3 % 
G o v e r n m e n t 
C a p i t a l i s t Z%% 2 8 % 
Small scale & 
Cooperative 2.8% 4»<%> 
The future balance depends upon two factors not 
strictly under control - the willingness of 
capitalists to go on producing, and the enthusiasm 
of peasants and artisans for cooperativisation. 
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But APP is to be 'Consolidated * rather than 
expand enormously - absorbing key (large) capitalist 
units and releasing small units to cooperatives 
Obviously, maximum feasible APP/would be (say) 
50 % of production and 3 5 % of employment; 
so this, for structural reasons, would remain a 
mixed economy. 
4.2 Particular problems of articulating terms of produc-
tion. APP is not rationally constructed (just 
inherited from Somoza) and must be reoriented 
(eg textile and chemical industries); large private 
sector decapitalising and must be stopped; merchants 
speculating and exporting capital; all this within 
modern sector with limitation of executive capacity. 
Negotiations with MNC's towards joint ventures 
with APP proceeding well. Articulation with coopera-
tive and small-scale sector through market relations 
(inputs, marketing, bank credit) needs great care 
to avoid either suffocation or 'peasant differentia-
tion'; this conditions the possibilities for 
popular participation. 
4.3 Changing relations of production and exchange 
roqu.i re greater worker/peasant control, at least 
of firm/locality/region/country, over relevant 
decision centers. Most progress in localities 
(barrio, municipio) with basic needs (education, 
health, food distribution)/; progress at enterprise 
level limited to worker assemblier and strenghte-
ning of trades unions; COIP still being restructured, 
INRA still forming enterprises themselves. More 
progress in cooperation (food) and national worker/ 
peasant organizations at a regional level. Danger 
of producing priviledged minority in state enter-
prise (only 34 % of workforce); an appropriate 
form of worker participation still not clear. 
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4.4 Special problems of 'middle classes1. State itself 
has bureacratic class which aspires instinctively 
to social control; living standards of doctors, 
engineers etc threatened by import controls; 
medium merchants very influential and being squeezed 
out during transition; these three groups closely 
limited by family ties; 
4.5 Aggregate problems of town and country. Transition 
model favours country in terms of production, prices 
and wages , infrastructure, social reform, etc; 
towns (including much of middle class, industrial 
proletariat and slum-dwellers) will have stagnant 
or even declining real incomes as towns of trade 
favour agriculture , social facilities are reorien-
ted, and investment centres on agriculture and 
energy. Some back-migration expected but severe 
social strain will result. 
4.6 Economie planning also a social relation of production 
gradually replacing capitalist irrationality; market 
tools will be used for the non-state sector 
(pricing, credit, purchasing etc); financial 
controls and centralised accumulation (but not 
production) decisions in APP. Problem of economie 
versus moral incentives in enterprise operation 
and labour productivity still not resolved. 
5. Agrarian Reform 
5.1 Centre of economy, dominating production, exports 
and employment. Main source of accumulation funds 
(exports) and wagegoods (food); also centre of 
future accumulation. Present land allocation 
about half to each, with balance moving towards 
food; labour force is semi-proletarian operating 
in both. 
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5.2 'Industrialization Debate' of (say) Russia is 
replicated within the rural sector in emphasis 
on exports (accumulation) or food (consumption), 
and to some extent on state enterprise versus 
peasant cooperatives (but not clear-cut). Medium-
term concern with export 'plateau'. 
5.3 Rural labour force neither worker nor peasant; 
seasonal cycle of activity. Initial fear of overall 
labour shortage and thus INRA resistence to 
'peasantization'; but now this not see as 
immediate problem, but rather one of wages, mobili-
zation etc. Distribution of land to sub-proleta-
riat and cooperativization linked to export estates 
going forward. 
5.4 Expropriation of large farms only, based on ine-
fficiency in use; allocation to APP or Cooperative 
depends on agrarian development plan for the area. 
Financial incentives to cooperativisation. Long-run 
objective of complete cooperativization with 
minority (efficiënt) state sector. 
5.5 In longer run, capitalization of export agriculture 
planned, mechanizing cotton, mining to land-inten-
sive labour-saving sectors (livestock, sugar) , 
holding labour in small towns through social faci-
lities etc to face labour shortage; peasant produc-
tion to be raised in efficiency with fertilizers, 
seeds, storage, etc; the two articulated on a 
regional basis. 
5.6 Separate organizations of ATC and UNAG and their 
progressive strengthening as a checknot only on 
capitalist farmers but also on the state itself. 
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5.7 Industrialization centred on agrarian reform, 
supporting it by inputs (chemical, fertilizers, 
tools, equipment maintenance, rural consumer 
goods, construction materials) and processing 
more of output; agroindustrial growth poles 
and commercial centres for peasant agriculture. 
Transition in a Single Country 
6.1 Nicaragua is small, technologically dependent, 
with open frontiers, very close to the USA. 
6.2 Small size limits industrialization potential, 
implying that only with stable progressive regimes 
in Central America is long-run development possible. 
Any industrial plan must have some assumption about 
El Salvador, for example. 
6.3 Technological dependence implies reliance on other 
large economies; existing technology US-oriented •• 
possibilities of Western Europe and Japan, even 
Mexico/Brazil. 
6.4 Open frontiers meanthat a wage/price system very 
different from (say) Costa Rica is very difficult 
to apply without 'inovements ' of goods and labour; 
close social contacts, communication networks,etc.; 
these present a very real constraint on economie 
and social reform. 
6.5 Finally, the US has no interest in a sucessful 
transition in Nicaragua, and tends to destabilize 
it, because it would be a 'bad example' to the 
rest of Latin America, quite apart from its 
geopolitical significance. 
E.V/.K. FitzGerald 
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NICARAGUA-Semin ar 
The Nicaraguan transition strategy ; transfer mechanisms and the 
political alliance 
1. After the victory of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 
(FSLN) in Nicaragua, the new economie policy is directed towards 
initiating an autonomous, national directed development process 
within the framework of a mixed planned economy. 
In the short term, the economie policy focusses on the reactivation of 
the economie process (economie rehabilitation, repair of the damaged 
production capacity, provision of the population with basic needs, 
creation of employment). This reactivation process makes use of the 
already existing overcapacity. Especially those sectors, which are 
important because of their contribution to reconstruction (building), 
foreign exchange earnings (agrarian exports to finance necessary imports 
of food, medical equipment, industrial inputs and machinery) and domestic 
popular food provision, receive priority in the reactivation process 
("reactivacion de la economïa en Beneficio del Pueblo"). 
The improvement of the living standards of the mass of the population is 
another central focus of the government reactivation policy. The increase 
of employment opportunities and the better working conditions give rise 
to a sharp growth of the total wage-sum and a lowering of labour-productivity. 
Since higher wages will lead to an inflationary pressure because of the shortage;of 
wage goods, the only short term solution can be a real improvement of living 
standards in non-monetary sense, e.g. by means of greater availability and 
access to social and collective services (education, health-care, transport, 
water) - the so-called 'social wage' - and by means of increased popular 
participation in management and execution of the economie programmes 
('moral incentives'). 
2. The reactivation policy encounters its limitations in the historical 
development of the structural characteristics of the Nicaraguan economie 
structure. The most important structural impediments, which restrict a more 
autonomous directed development strategy are : 
- unbalanced structure of production (few linkages) 
the dependency on foreign trade 
dualistic structure within the agricultural sector 
- high level of migration and urbanisation; regional isolation 
- high levels of unemployment and underemployment (urban informal sector, 
rural seasonal employment) 
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unequal distribution of income and property (unbalanced structure of 
domestic demand) 
shortages in financing government expenditures, investment and imports 
- intensified by the personal enrichment practices of Sonoza - which 
had to be covered by foreign lending (public debt) and domestic money 
creation (inflationary impact). 
To overcome these structural impediments for economie development, a 
programme of transformation of the economie structure will be executed. 
The basic objectives of this transformation process focusses on the 
initiation of a national oriented process of capital accumulation (further 
and more equal development of the production forces; national integration 
of the production structure, diversification of trade dependency), with a 
simultaneous revision of the production relations (employment opportunities, 
income distribution and working conditions), within the context of a 
transition of political relations, ownership relations and organizational 
forms of production. 
3. The most basic problem of all transition strategies concerns the dilemma 
between accumulation and consumption and the connected debate about priority 
to the agricultural or the industrial sector (Fel'dman's theory of growth; 
Preobrazhensky), 
In small socialist developing countries the transition strategy has to 
incorporate the foreign trade sector. The accumulation process in these 
types of economies can make use of the 'potential surplus', incorporated 
in imported luxury consumption, the unequal distribution of incomes and 
economie losses connected with foreign trade (transfer prices, deterioration 
of the terms of trade, e t c ) , to finance the development process. 
The state will be the central institution to control and direct the surplus 
utilization process, according to the objectives of the national development 
planning, and within the limits of financial integrity, by means of its 
control on the material production conditions (marketing, credit provision 
and inputs). 
4. Within the Nicaraguan transition strategy, the agricultural sector will 
accomplish a major function. The development of the agricultural sector 
is important because of its important functions in the domestic food supply 
and employment creation, and its contribution to financing of economie 
development. Within the agricultural sector, a large-scale capital intensive 
export sector (cotton, coffee, sugar, meat) - predominantly in the hands of 
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big private farmers, processing industries and the state - contributes to 
foreign exchange earnings, while a small-scale labour-intensive food 
producing sector (beans, maize) - in the hands of a great number of small 
campesinos - provides for the domestic food supply. This dualistic nature 
of the agricultural sector is a result of the historical development of the 
Nicaraguan export model, based on monopolization of resources and a great 
availability of cheap labour. Between the different objectives of the 
transition strategy exists a certain kind of conflict; a simultaneous 
realization of the objectives of financing economie development (which 
means : stimulation of the agricultural export sectors) and domestic food 
supply and employment creation (which menas : stimulation of the food 
producing sectors) in almost impossible, both in social-economic respect 
as well as in political respect, 
The economie contradictions between the promotion of export-crops or food 
crops refer to the classical dilemma between accumulation and consumption 
(see 3.). In the short term export crops are necessary for the promotion 
of foreign exchange (to finance necessary imports), but on the other hand, 
there is an increase in domestic food demand, caused by more employment, 
higher wages and general rising expectations. Conflicts arise in terms 
of investment and credit - allocation, inputs availability, labour supply 
(stimulation of food production by means of land reform restricts the 
labour-supply in the harvest-season of the export sector), price policy, 
regional policy and intersectoral linkages. 
In the Nicaraguan economie planning the state acts as a 'mediator' between 
these different positions. Within the framework of a mixed planned 
economy (80% of the production-capacity is in private hands), the state 
only controls the central positions in banking, foreign and domestic trade 
and input distribution. By means of indirect-mechanisms, the state controls 
the circulation and accumulation spheres and performs a major function in 
the direction of the surplus utilizing and transfer process. The options 
available in the Nicaraguan economie policy in this respect are the 
following : 
a) direction of the flow of funds; the agricultural export sector can be 
used to finance necessary imports, and government expenditure for rural 
collective and sociaL services. By means of this structure an indirect 
transfer from the export sector to the food producing sector will be 
possible, without any inflationary impact. 
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b) trade strategy; food self-sufficiency (will be reached in 1982) 
and 'diversification of export dependency'(by regions, by products') 
are the central guidelines for the foreign trade strategy. In the 
longer run a strategy of export substitution and food exports will be 
designed to escape from the dependency problem facing all small 
developing countries. 
c) agrarian policy; by means of a policy of 'price scissors' (controlled 
prices of inputs and outputs) the state has an indirect control on the 
agricultural surplus. This_.policy is supplémented by a differential 
application of other instruments (credit, land rent) to different types 
of farmers. 
d) regional development programs to incorporate the more marginal zones 
of the country in the national economie development process (and in 
the political process). The expansion of the colonization program and 
connected infrastructure is part of this process. 
e) labour-policy; uniform labour conditions have been introduced to 
protect wage labour. 
f) popular organization, to strengthen the power positions of the working 
class, to incorporate the population in the planning process and the 
management of enterprises and as an 'instrument' to guarantee the 
cooperation of the private sector. 
In general, the most important problem facing the state is its 'relative 
autonomous' position, which will cause a tendency towards a fiscal crisis 
(negative budget balance), because of the small direct productive role of 
the state and its limited control on private savings and investment. This 
will act as a pressure towards further nationalization. 
7. The solution to these economie dilemmas is of great importance for the 
political alliance underlying the Nicaraguan revolution. The political 
alliance is a result of the historical process of economie development in 
Nicaragua, based on an agro-export model with a high level of proletarization^ 
which generated the material conditions for a coherent worker-peasant 
alliance. Proletariat, semi-proletariat and sub-proletariat (together more 
than 80% of the rural EAP) are organized in one single organization (ATC). 
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The consolidation of this alliance and the incorporation of urban groups 
in it, rests on the state's ability to meet the economie, social and 
political demands of workers and peasants and on the spreading of benefits 
available to different sectors of the alliance. 
The material conditions for cementing the broader worker-peasant alliance 
depend on the successful managing of the internal terms of trade between 
the rural and the urban sectors. Simultaneously the urban food supply 
(at reasonable prices) and the rural availability of capital goods (to 
increase productivity) and industrial consumption goods (to motivate 
for surplus production) has to be achieved.in the sense that no 'unequal 
exchange' exists. This dilemma is being managed, not by using food 
output-prices as an instrument (because of the inflationary impact), 
but by improving agricultural production conditions (credit, input 
distribution, land rent, extension). In this way, a rural productivity 
increase (financed by the state) can simultaneously bring about higher 
food production at stable prices (constant workers incomes)and higher 
peasant incomes. 
Ruerd Ruben 
February, 1982 
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NICARAGUA 
Agrarian Reform, constraints and policy-options 
Constraints with respect to a further process of land-acquisition 
for land reform: 
- political : opposition of group(s) of landowners 
affected by new land reform measures 
financial : the need to compensate landowners who 
will be affected by such measures 
economie : through land distribution less (seasonal) 
labour available for export crops 
managerial ; the Government already has to run production 
in 20% of cultivated area. 
The political constraint presents a real dilemma. 
On the one hand 'side landless labour and minifundistas are pressing 
the Government to distribute land. Land that for long was withheld 
them by a landowner-entrepreneur class, producing for export markets, 
that by monopolizing landlownership and land-use assured themself of 
the availability of seasonal labour. Land occupations, now checked 
by the Government, bore clear evidence of this popular claim. 
At the other side, the Government already confiscated the land of the 
Somoza-clan and collaborating landowners. Further land reform will 
alienate landowner graups, the Government still hopes will participate 
in the reconstruction and development process. 
The specific role of this landowner - entrepreneur class is in providing 
the foreign - currency the country desperately needs. For the present, 
land belonging to this class cannot be affected. 
Still a large proportion of private land (80% of total), and certainly 
the best and irrigated part is in the hands of this landowner-entrepreneur 
class. The transition process requires a further land reform. 
Development cannot be thought of leaving aside the best land resources 
of the country, neither can one think of development without changing the 
production relations, especially land-ownership. 
The financial constraint 
Land of landowners associated with Somoza was confiscated, remaining 
landowners who participated in the opposition, or at least did not 
support Somoza, should receive someform of compensation for land 
affected, there is, however, not much room in the Government budget 
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for compensation payments, several nationalized banks, hospitals, 
schoolsimoreover are awaiting compensation payments. The capacity to 
compensate landowners is thus very restricted. 
The economie constraints 
As indicated, production in the export sector is based on withholding 
the rural masses access to the land and other productive resources, 
in order to assure the availability of cheap labpur, especially for 
harvesting of export crops. It should be clear f rom the artificially 
created labour supply that the factor mix in this sector does not 
reflect real factor availability relations. Relatively too',much capital 
and too much seasonal labour seems to be concentrated especially on 
cotton farms. But as this has been the case since 1950, productivity 
has increased, net production values are high in this sector. 
Distribution of land, credit, inputs to small farmers and landless 
labour automatically will reduce the labour supply for export crops, 
moreover seasonal labour migration from neighbouring countries already 
stopped. Distribution of productive resources will promote food-production 
for local consumption and for the internal market. Eventually some 
surpluses might become available for export. For the time being it 
will not be so easy to reach productivity levels, net production values, 
comparable with export crops. Though the production relations in the 
present export agriculture must change, this cannot be realized very 
quickly, in order not to endanger this source of foreign exchange 
as long as it is needed» 
The management constraint 
The confiscation of land that belonged to the Somoza clan and associates 
extended state ownership to one fifth of total agricultural land. 
The running of state- and collective farms, to suddenly and on such 
a scale, and the channeling of increasing credit, technical assistence, 
organization resources to small farmers, clearly exceed Government 
management capacity in the rural sector. High productivity levels in 
agriculture need considerable time to be developed. 
This constraint presently resetricts the further take-over of land 
next to be managed by land reform institutions. 
Policies to overcome the constraints 
Policy should aim at reducing the dependency of the country on the 
landowner-entrepreneur class now providing the indispensable foreign 
currency and generating considerable surpluses. 
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This policy depends to a considerable degree on the taking-over 
of these two functions by the state- and collective sector, by the 
small and medium farmers. Various policy options are available, 
together, coherently interrelated they should overcome the actual 
constraints and enable the advancement of the agrarian transition 
process. 
- the introduction of landsaving practices in order to reduce the 
export crops area, which presently cannot be affected by land 
reform measures; 
- the creation of year round employment in agriculture and 
increasing the productivity of small farmers, will help to in-
crease wages in the export sector; 
determine minimum wage-levels for seasonal labour in export crops; 
improve living conditions of the migrating seasonal labour in 
cotton and coffee; 
promote the use and training of voluntary labour in the harvesting 
of cotton and coffee; 
- proper pricing for inputs and caj>ital goods for agriculture, 
especially those imported; 
providing access to inputs and capital foods for small and 
middle size farmers; 
promote production of food for the internal market, aiming as well 
for an overflow to external markets as soon as surpluses can be 
developed, in order to diversify agricultural exports; 
increase the capacity to run state - and collective farms, in 
particular cotton and coffee estates, in order to reduce dependency 
on the landowner - entrepreneur class and to enable additional 
land take-overs; 
increase the Governments capacity to assist small and middle farmers 
in rising their productivity levels and net production values, so 
that the centre of gravity in agriculture can be shifted to other 
classes of producers and to other crops; 
rent the land from land-owners not interested in continuation of 
production; 
compensate landowners with bonds, thus postponing and spreading the 
compensation payments.
 T _ , 
K
 J.P. de Groot 
februari 1982 
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TRANSITION UITH PEASANTS 
A contribution to the seminar on "The Transition Strategy of Nicaragua" 
February 26th, 1982. Free University Amsterdam. 
By Kees Blokland ; 
"The Russian and Chinese examples, however, also indicate that while such a 
revolution may be made with the aid of the peasantry, it is not made for 
the sake of the peasantry." (Eric R.Wolf, Peasants, London 1966, p.109) 
"Estan sanos y vigorosos, en plena lucha, por ser lo que son en mejores 
condiciones. Eso si, estan mas solos que cualquier otro grupo de la 
sociedad." (A.Warman, Ensayos sobre el campesinado en Mexico, Mexico 1980,p.lO) 
') Economist. Institute for Social Science Research in Developing Countries, 
The Hague, The Netherlands. 
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In the context of the general dicussion on the transition strategy of Nicaragua, 
I would like to deal with the aspects concerning the agricultural sector. 
To make my position clear, T shall briefly make a few remarks on some central 
characteristics of the agricultural sector. As a point of departure, I present 
table 1. 
Table 1. Influence of the government in the agricultural sub-sectors  
Other major mechanisms of control 
area x 000 manz. 
'80-'81 APP 
cotton 
sugar 
135 
62 
23 
26 
coffee 
cattle 
134 
4-100 
17 
493 
corn 
beans 
340 
150 
— 
export trade through the state organization, ENAL 
5 out of 6 sugar plants are nationalized; export trade 
tfxroughthe state organization, ENAZUGAR. 
export trade through the state organizatio, ENCAFE. 
75% of the abattoirs are nationalized, export trade 
Ihrough the state organization ,ENCAR 
Source: K.Blokland. De agrarische sektor van Nicaragua;beschrijving en beleidsopties. 
Amsterdam, 19 81) 
This table shows that the government has influence on the production decisions in most 
of the important sub-sectors, either through land property (APP), or through trade 
and processing. Only the cultivation and distribution of corn and beans break 
away from the influence of the state. In an evaluation of the agricultural sector 
the government remarked on this issue:"ENABAS (Empresa Nicaraguënse de Alimentos 
Basicos) no tenxa el conocimiento ni la experiencia suficiente para desplazar 
al comerciante tradicional..." (El sector agropecuario, Managua 1980, p.36). 
Simplified, one could state that the government has control over the production 
decisions in the agricultural export sectors, but not over those in the sectors 
that produce food crops for home consumption. 
The farmers who cultivate corn and beans are mostly peasants (campesinos). There 
are two categories of peasants. The first primarily produce for their own 
consumption. They sell part of their corn harvest and work for big landowners and 
coffee and cotton producers, to earn a cash income. 
The seeond catcgory are peasants who besides food crops also cultivate cash crops, 
coffee and cotton. The first. cat.egory is mairiLy to be found in the eastern regions 
of the country (Costa Atlantica,Frontera Agrxcola). The seeond category of peasants 
make up the so-called "Cordon Minifundiario" found around the cities in the 
western areas. (J.Wheelock, Apuntes sobre el desarollo ecónómico y social de 
Nicaragua, Managua without date, FSLN). 
To elucidate the question of the minimum state control over the corn and beans 
subsectors, one has to review the discussion on land reform. The government has 
four principal arguments for being reluctant in continuing the land reforms. 
(Blokland, op.cit. Summary, 198l). One of the arguments is that radical land 
reform is politically undesirable. It would force the government into nationalizing 
lands of farmers who did not play a major role in keeping Somoza in power, and who 
often supported the revolution. Fromthe point of view of the peasants, this 
group of farmers is the class of exploiters. The group consist of the farmers on 
whose lands they earned hunger wages. The same farmers are raoreover shopkeeper's 
and truckdrivers and control the prices in the villages and therefore the income 
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of the peasants. In this class one finds the 'comerciante tradicional' who could 
not be displaced by ENABAS. 
If it is politically undesirable to affect the middle class farmers in a land 
reform program, then it must be equally undesirable to affect their strategie 
trade position. 
I now come to the subject of our discussion. An economie transformation in 
Nicaragua starts from a situation in which the structure of the agricultural 
production is oriented towards the production of export crops. These crops 
generate most of the foreign currency. 
In view of the central place export crops have in the Nicaraguan economy, in view 
of the minimum control the government has over production and trade of food crops 
and the political reluctance to gain control over trade of corn and beans, it 
seems obvious that government attention is first of all directed towards export 
crops. Thus, the agricultural export sector keeps on receiving most of the 
financial (credits and investments) and technical assistance. The major part of the 
inputs will go to this sector and most of the technological research will be on 
crops this sector produces. The corn producers, espacially the peasants producing 
mainly for family consumption, will be attended indirectly, i.e. with money 
the government withdraws from the surplus generated in the sector of agricultural 
export crops, and which need not to be spent to pay off the foreign debt or to 
build up the army. (see also R.Ruben, Agrarische hervorming in Nicaragua, Amsterdam 
1981, p.17) 
The viability of this strategy in the light of a transition to a socialist society 
—albeit a 'pluriform socialist society' (Gorostiaga)—will be examined by 
evaluating the role of the peasants in the economy: The production conditions 
of the peasants are often described in terms of a "peasant economy", which then 
is confronted with the capitalist economy. In discussions on the question whether 
one deals with a different mode of production, the view has been gaining ground 
recently, that the organization of the peasant production does differ from the 
organzation of capitalist large scale farms, but that the peasant economy is not 
a different mode of production® It is merely one of the manifestations of capitalism 
in the countryside. The existence of a peasant economy therefore cannot be 
explained by saying that capitalism has not expanded far enough into the country-
side. On the contrary, the peasant economy is an aspect of capitalist expansion in 
the countryside. 
This point of view repudiates the idea that capitalist development in rural areas 
will be aceompanied by prolitarization in a strict sense and the disappearance 
of the peasants. Warman (op. rit,, p.10) remarks: "Hasta los criticos del advance 
del capitalismo coinciden, con frecuencia inusitada, en que su desaparición no solo 
es inevitable sino que seria muy saludable", (see H.Ruiz, cited in: Ruben op.cit. 
p.23), and "...En ningun caso los encontré dispuestos a morirse come grupo. 
Estan sanos y vigorosos, en plena lucha, por ser lo que son en mejores condiciones. 
Eso si, estan mas solos que cualquier otro grupo de la sociedad". 
Being incorporated in the capitalist system, the peasants contribute to the 
capitalist accumulation. The peasants are the seasonal workers on the coffee and 
cotton estates, but the wages they earn do not provide for fuil reproduction of 
their labour force. The peasant himself provides for part of it by cultivating corn 
@) see e»g-:S.Silva, in: P.Singer, Capital e trabalho no campo, Sao Paulo, 1977, p.10. 
and,*L.Pare, El proletariado agrxcola en Mexico, Mexico 1977, PP 36 and 37 • 
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and beans. Thus, by selling his labour force, but also by selling his corn or 
cash erop, the peasant transfers value to other parts of the economy. (see also, 
Blokland, a.o.; Enkele aspekten van de agrarische sector van Mexico, Amsterdam 
1979, P- 30). 
The strategy described (i.e. indirect attention for peasants) repeats on a national 
level the policy of international capitalism towards the developing countries; 
giving tips with one hand of what they took with the other. 
Capitalist development will not lead to the disappearance of the peasants, nor 
will socialist development be able to dispose of the peasants in a capitalist way. 
They have a right to become fuil members of the new society. Direct action is 
needed to achieve "ser lo que son en mejores condiciones". Improving their living 
conditions means affecting the surplus of the agricultural export sector and this 
can only be achieved by affecting the rural power relations. 
An additional political argument shows the long term viability of this alternative 
strategy: A deterioration of the living conditions of the peasants in the long run, 
in an effort to proletarize them, will make the eastern peasants puppets in the 
hands of enemies of the revdition. At the moment, defence against foreign agression 
has high governmental priority. To counter the spread of destabilization from 
the Costa Atlantica into the Frontera Agricola, an improvement of the living 
conditions of the peasants in that region emerges again as a priority. 
The Hague, February 1982 
CB. 
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AMSTERDAM, 26th February 1982 
JOB Algra 
Luud Clercx 
CREDIT AND GROWTH OF SMALL SCALE FOODPRODUCTION UT NICARAGUA 
COMPARED to industry agriculture shows some outstanding seasonal peaks in 
investment of labour and capital, and the time between planting (imvestment) and 
harvesting is comparatively long. Therefore, the demand for credit is relatively 
high. Agriculture, however, has a low organical composition of capital, is less 
profitable than industry, and carries many uncertainties with it (erop failures, 
price fluctuations etc). Furthermore there exists an unequal exchange between 
industry and agriculture, and means of production (land) are highly immobile, 
which obstructs shifting capital to the most profitable sectors. Therefore, 
private banks show little interest in extending credit to agriculture. In 
particular scattered smaïl scale agriculture is not solvent with regard to 
commercial criteria and it takes high administration costs* 
Tftia": situation was reflected in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua. In 1970 govern-
mental institutions accounted for virtually all agricultural credit; "JOfo was 
extended by the Banco Nacional de Nicaragua (BNN) and 12.8^ by the Instituto 
de Fomento Nacional (INFONAC). The Rural Credit Program, designed mainly for 
small scale food' production, accounted for just 11.2^ of BNN agricultural 
credit. (Ramirez 1972s 1 - 2 ) . Credits for maize, rice, beans and sorghum 
covered less than 15% of the total areal of these products. (ibid., p. 29). 
Most agricultural credit was extended to large scale agro-export farms, cotton 
taking the lion share. 
The main source of credit for small farmers were private traders and estate 
owners (informal or non-institutional credit)» The main aim of this type of 
credit was to ensure supplies of cheep food for the rural working class, and 
to keep small farmers dependent so they would continue working seasonally on the 
big estates, Extension of commodity production raised ground rent and -prices. 
Capitalist penetration resulted in the classical process of concentration of the 
land and proletarianisation (original or primitive accumulation). Especially 
since the rapid growth of cotton production after 1950 this process threatened 
reproduction of the labour force, and it created an ©xplosive political situation 
in the country side. 
State intervention was called for. The agrarian reform, which was started in 
1964, existed merely in some colonisation projects in areas not yet directly 
penetrated by capitalism for a handful of marginalised farmers and landless 
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labourers» As tensions grew the Instituto de Bienestar Campesino (iNVIERNO) was 
erected, supported by USAID, to operate in the most impoverished areas, IFVTERÜO 
was to dampen extreme poverty, rural-urban migration9 and social conflict, without 
reducing supply of labour» The isolated sectorial approach (capacitation and 
credit) was bound to fail under the circumstances, and INVTEBNO merely supported 
a selected, relatively wealthy group of "srnalJ" producers» 
INVIEPJTO and similar projects were critioised emphatically by the political 
opposition under Somoza dictatorship (Nicaragua 197Ö Is 60 - 106), and the 
Sanèinist victory meant a radical break with this policy, 
TEE SECTOEIAL approach of the past is now being developed into an integral policy, 
to set in motion a radical transformation of the inherited socio-economic 
structure» Food production is stinrulated in order to reduce the on®«isided dependence 
on export products (mainly cotton, coffee and cattle), to cut food imports and to 
raise living standards of small farmers, t^aditionally producing the bulk of basic 
grains» Since smalirfood production is largely centered in the most pauperised 
areas, especially Esteli and Matagalpa, it serves to reduce regional inequality 
as well, and it contains rural-urban migration» 
Credit is one of the main instuments to raise food production. Both government and 
ATG (Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo) emphasize the direct correlation 
between credit and growth of production. All banks and other financial bodies have 
been centralised and brought under state control, and the Banco lacional de 
Desarollo (BND) is now the main source of agricultural financing. Credit to small 
farmers was raised from C$ 100 million (US$ 10 million) in 1979 to CS 700 millioi» 
in 1980 (Petras 1981; 84)* 64$ of the maize areal was covered (MIPLAN I9&O1 83 - 150^ 
Credit is closely linked with extension services and technical assistance, granted 
chiefly by BND and PROCAMPO» Stimulating political consciousness forms part of 
educations of farmers and workers as well as agricultural officers, and ATC has 
its own institutes and oourses, 
Distribution of inputs is largely handled by the Empresa Nicaragüense de Insumos 
Agropecuarios (ENIA). Of the total marketable output of basic grains in I98O 40% 
was marketed by the Empresa Mcaragüense de Alimentaciones Basicos (ENABAS)e 
(MIPLAN 198ls 71). ENABAS provides services to private traders to reduce losses 
and keep up quality» Within a year prices for basic grains were brought under 
controlf thus reducing usurious profits by private traders» The government 
displays a tight price-policy» It has a cónsid^rable share in distribution, 
through the Corporación Comercial del Pueblo (CORCOP)j, and ATC set up a network 
of shops in the countryside* APP share in food productions eeg* 16 J)10 *n maize 
production (Petras I98I1 82)f sustains government controle The new law on 
agrarian reform contains exploitation of tenants through high rents, sets a 
limit to land propertys and tackles tm(der)productive use of land» 
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MASS-ORGANISATION is considered essöBtial for mobilisation of all available 
forces and for deploying government policy, Many ohanges were actually intro-
duced by mass-organisations. FSLN and ATC for example started the land reform . 
in the liberated areas before the Sandinist victory, By June 1980 ATC member-
ship amounted to 107,000, of whieh 57*000 were small farmers (ibid., p. Ö)P 
nearly one third of the agricultural labour force of 355*000. (MIPLAN 1981 s 
86)» ATC, however, did not succeed in organizing medium-size farmers, who are 
particularly liable to reactionary propaganda (fear of expropriation of land). 
This was one of the reasons why the Unión de Agricultores y Ganaderos (UÏÏAG) 
was founded in April 1981» Both ATC and UNAG are now represented in the Comités 
de Pequena y Mediana Produoción Agropecuaria and the Comités de Crédito, in 
which they cooperate with BND and PROCAMPO. All four cooperate with MABAS, 
and ATC, TJNAG and PROCAMPO are members of the Consejos de Reforma Agraria. ATC 
is now represehting the Cooperativas %rïcolas Sandinistas (CASsj produotion 
oooperatives), while TJTTAG represente the Cooperativas de Crédito y Servioio 
(CCSs). 
In order to be able to serve the high number of small farmers, formation of 
oooperatives is stiaiulated» An estimated 70$ has joined one of the 2,512 ooope-
ratives by June 1980.(Deere & Marchetti 1981$ 56)» Although oollectivisation 
is a long term goal, already 15$ of the production oooperatives (CASs) has been 
founded by small farmers» (ibid,, p, 55)• Confisoated barren lands are extended 
to oooperatives for food production. Of the 97j400 small producers receiving 
credit 73,854 were members of a cooperative, (JGRN 19813 4, 8). Over 50$ of 
these cooperative assooiates owned less than 2,5 hectares of land, (Deere & 
Marchetti I98I1 62), CAS members pay 7$ interest, CCS members 8$, unorganised 
small farmers 11$, and big farmers 14$» (ibid,, p, 57), PROCAMPO officers, 440 
out of a national total of 796, had visited 97,353 farmers by 30th June 1980, 
75«8$ were members of a cooperative, (MIPLAN I98OS 100, 102), 
SO FAR the success of government policy for small scale food production has 
been impressive, In I979-I98O agricultural output feil by 37$« (Deere & 
Marchetti I98I1 52), By 1981 food produotion surpassed pre-1979 levels, 
Nicaragua is now virtually self-sufficient with regard to basio grains, 
although imports are being continued to create strategie stocks and to keep 
prices under control, Nonetheless present policy raises several questions 
of which some are listed below, 
1, The steep increase of rural credit means a heavy draw on public funds and 
foreign exchange» In 1981 75«9$ of public expenditure was to be supplied by 
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foreign sources» (MIPLAN 1981s 123)» Interest rates on rural credit are by 
no means sufficiënt to cover interest on (foreign) loans, administration costs, 
and rate of inflation* This goes in particular for inputs, which are virtually 
all imported, and which are increasing because of oil prices (oil being an 
important element of inputs)» ENIA is working with sheer external funds and 
has to pay 16% interest» (MIPLAN I98O1 112)» As for the moment locally 
available substitutes seem to be limited» 
2» Expending large funds on small scale food produotion might slow down overall 
economie growth. Small scale food production has a low profitability» This 
should be carefully weighed against advantages like self-sufficiency and income 
transfer» 
3» There must be a constructive demand for credit» Raising production requires 
more inputs, which are not yet supplied sufficiently. Farmers in need of new 
inputs, tools and farming methods to increase production must be instructed 
how to use them» In 1980 Nicaragua had 796 agricultural instructors and super-
visors at its disposal, Whüte. the Institaito Wicaragüense de Reforma Agraria (INRA) 
alone needed some 20?000 - 30,000 for carrying out the agrarian reform. (CIERA/ 
IVO 19811 3)* It will take years to reach anywhere this number. 
Deere and Marchetti reported that in some cases credit supply was much higher 
than what the land could possibly produce at market prices, overfinancing, and 
part of it might have been used to increase consumption levels» (19811 62), 
Especially at the agricultural-frontier in the interior infrastructure (roads, 
marketing facilities etc») is poor so that increased marketable output cannot 
be easily marketed which results in possible defaults and indebtedness» (ibidem)» 
Due to abnormal circumstances in I98O nearly 100% of working capital and 
investment were financed by the BHD« In 1981 this was to be diminished to a 
maximum of 64%» (MIPLAN 1981S 40, 144)• Producers financing 36% or more will 
check overfinancing and using productive credit for non-productive purposes. 
4» Agricultural ufismployment was reduced to 20% (ibid®, p, 86), but cotton and 
coffee harvests (3 months a year) are threatened by labour shortages» These are 
caused by reduction of the working day, on APP farms by 30%, staying away of 
seascüal workers from El Salvador and Honduras, much higher levels of school 
attendance by children (before 1979 an important source of labour), and raised 
income of small farmers, which reduced the need to supply it through wage labour. 
(Deere & Marchetti 1981$ 60, 63 - 64)• This is one aspect of the friction between 
the (short term) goal of steeping up export production to meet balance of payment 
deficits and increase accumulation for financing and income transfer, and the 
(long term) goal of increasing food production, raising income of small farmers 
etc,, This problem affects APP farms, mainly producing export products, most 
seriously* The APP seotor is assigned a central role in accumulation and raising 
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foreign exchange» 
The alternative proposed by Deere and Marchetti to overcome the contradiction 
between export produotion and food production, exporting grains to Mexico, 
Venezuela, Central America and the Caribbean (1981s 70), would demand a further 
subsidizing of food production since (small scale) food production cannot 
compete with world market prices. (MIPLAN I98OS 885 1981s 71)» Spreading demand 
for labour more evenly over the year through erop diversification, especially 
irrigated rice, offers more perspectives. 
5. fieducing unequal exchange and raising income levels of small farmers by 
paying producers more just prices for food crops affects workers income. In 
order to protect real wages the difference between domestio purchases and imports 
was to be subsidised in 1981 to an amount of C$ 320 million. (MIPLAN I98I1 71). 
Bue to indreasing standards of living of workers and small farmers consumption 
rises, by 29% in 1980 (ibid., p. 81), which is not being met by increase of 
produotion so far. As a result imports of non-pröductive means of consumption 
and rate of inflation increase, which affects low income groups most. 
6. The heavy emphasis on forming cooperatives is successful is one looks at 
membership increase. A lack of information on the reasons for this policy and 
low political consciousness among farmers, however, might create resistance on 
the side of the farmers. The rapid growth of the cooperative movemsnt puts an 
extensive claim on agricultural instructors for teaching cooperative administra-
tors» As a result the knowledge gap between authorities and administrators on 
the one side, and ordinary meaibers on the other, might widen. At the same time 
a growing political consciousness and radicaiisation among part of the small 
farmers might increase their demands. If the socio-economic situation prohibits 
meeting these demands and farmers are not sufficiently informed on the impossi-
bilities, it will lead to resistance and frustration. In other words, there 
exists a tension between rapid and slow changes. 
7» Although a long term goal, production cooperatives are considered to be the 
most efficiënt form of agricultural production by (former) small farmers. It 
certainly has some economies of scale, but in agriculture organizing labour 
in large entities hardly ever increases productivity. It is difficult to organize 
rationally workers who are scattered over the fields. With regard to discipline, 
the rural family working on a small farm cannot be easily beaten. Productivity 
of land on small farms is higher than on big estates. If land-labour ratio is 
low, increasing productivity of land (by more, improved inputs etc.) should 
prevail, (Ellman I98O1 127 - 132). 
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REPORTS OF THE SEMINAR DISCUSSIONS 

First theme : Social Class structure and the Politics of Transition 
in Nicaragua 
Ken Post in introduoing his paper emphasizes,that transition is not the same 
as economie polioiestas economie development projects,transition is 
primarily politics,class struggle and changes in class power. The situation aft? 
the 19th july in Nicaragua was defin®.d by the bloc of opposition,that was formec 
inthe revolution,and that because of its composition had a oommon ideology tha± 
eould be charaeterized as broad,vague and minimal.This revolutionary bloc was 
formed very late in the struggle and oontained class elements opposed to 
socialisme.Beals had to be made with landlords,industrialists and petty bour-
geoisie, that makes the post-revolutionary situation very complex.Class straggle 
must start as soon as possible,as open as possible in order to give a clear 
orientation to the transition process. 
In the discussion it was remarked,that in the paper emphasis was on internal 
factors,bat ext-ernal factors seem as important as internal ones. 
- Vilhout under stimating the exteraal influences,one can say that these 
external forces work through the internal power bloc.The first thing the 
ïrente Sandinista (FSLM)has to do is to attack.,tosmash the former allies in 
the revolutionary bloc,and to re-direct policies in order to develop the poli-
tioal groups,that give a raass-basis to the power-bloe.Sueh policies inolude im-
proving the economie situation of workers and farmers.lt would be good for 
example not to speak about the people in general,but of the labouring people 
It is impossible to hide,that the actual power bloc,the FSLN, is revolutionary 
and aims to follow a socialistic road.It would be better quickly to form the 
socialistic society pereeived,as the blookade through the opposition is in the 
raaking. 
In the discussion it was further indicated that the actual economie situation 
leaves Tery little room for alienating the bourgeoisie classes.Their partici-
pation is needed in order to improve the living conditions of the masses.Vhich 
means that the JSLSS should be eareful in promoting the class struggle. 
The external situation also calls for caution (see Chili).Inthis respect the 
support of the ïrente to the Mexican peace proposal for El Salvador,the an-
nouneeaent of general eleetions in Hicaragoa for 1985,can be regarded as conces-
sions,as gestisres to apease exteraal powers« 
The mixed economy calls for a mixed political situation as well. 
Research,espeeially coraparative studies,can be a useful contribution of out-
siders to Hicaragoa. 
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Second theme; "The political economy of the transition strategy in 
Nicaragua"* 
Nicaragua is a smalls technologically dependant and, with regard 
to foreign trade, open country» Furthermore it can be characterized 
by a surplus of land and a shortage of labour» 
The government raakes it one's object tos 
1» satisfy basic needs 
2» reduce (economie) dependance 
3» start a process of accumulation and economie restruction and 
initiate a transitionprocess to socialisme 
The agricultural sector plays a central role in the economie 
development, especially with regard to production (wage goods), 
exports (foreign exchange/accumulation) and employment. 
There are limitations to agricultural exports, e..g# the cotton area 
decreased because of a) lower prices, b) problems of seasonal 
employment, c) ecological reasons, 
To reduce economie dependance, Nicaragua is trying; 
1, to limit and substitute imports, e.g, energy. 
The use of diesel (for buses) is not easy to change, as it is 
some kind of basic need; the same goes for electricity, the use 
of which will increase because of electrification of rural areas. 
Petrol gives problems because it is used for the cars of the middle 
class. Substitutes already available or possible are geothermica, 
hydro-electricity, solar energy and (although still too expensive 
because of tranportation costs) cottonstraw, 
2. to restructure demands (limitation of non-basic consumption). 
3» to set up industries in suport of agriculture by inputs and 
processing of agricultural outputs, and for fullfilling basic 
needs such as housing or clothing, 
The industrialization is limited because of the small market in 
Nicaragua itself and because of the collapse of the Central American 
Common Market (CACM). 
It is clear that a change in the situation in the rest of Central 
America (El Salvador) is essential for the future transition in 
Nicaragua» This stresses the more the importance of the agricultural 
sector and the agricultural exports (-surplus, not of peasants but 
of foreign exchange)» 
This model favours the rural Standard of living; the urban Standard 
of living will be stagnant or even declining, 
The urban population is predominantly concentrated in one city, Managua, 
which is shown by the reformulated population figures in the following 
table: 
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1980 reformulated 
total population 2,733,000 2,733,000 
rural population 1,311,000 1,752,000 
urban population 1,^22,000 y8l,000 (of which 600,000 in Managua) 
The reformulation considers rural ci.ties of which the majority of 
the inhabitants work as agricaltural labourer. 
The urban proletariat is about 32 % (including civil servants, 
merchants etc.) of the urban population. When we consider the urban 
proletariat in the material production it only counts 15 %• 
The rural class structure is as follows: 
rich and medium peasants 30 % 
middle peasantry 9 % 
semiproletariat 36 % 
subproletariat 17 % 
proletariat 8 % 
100 % 
With the aim of giving the subproletariats access to small plots of 
land to become serniproletariats, this class can grow to a total of 
more than 50 % of the rural economie active population. In this way 
they (have to) stay availab]e to some extent for seasonal employment 
on the exportfarms, but with wages based on the fact that they also 
have to work the rest of the year on their 'own' plot. 
'Vhiü 'articulation of the modes of production * is very important. 
Further nationalization in the private sector are not being considered 
because of economie reasons: the state is not dynamic,while there is 
an urgent need for increasing production. 
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Third part: Agrarian Transition and the Role of the Agrarian 
Sector in the Nicaraguan Transition Strategy. 
Starting points for the discussion are given by way of brief 
introductions by: 
- Jan de Groot» The thesis he puts forward is the need to continue 
agro-exports, though at a more limited scale and in a way that 
facilitates its ultimate transformation within the confc®xt of 
the agricultural sector at large. The underlying dilemma consists 
of on the one hand the need of agro-exports and on the other 
haiid the choice for a kind of basic needs strategy including 
improved domestic food suprdy. Apart from short—term imperatives 
like debt-servicing out of foreign currency earnings this 
dilemma is aggravated by the existing relations of production 
within the agro-export sector that set a heavy burden on the 
small 'semi-proletarian' agrarian producers» 
The major constraints in the process leading to structural 
agricultural transformation as well as examples of possible 
viable measures to reduce or elirainate these constraints are 
discussed at length in de Groot's paper to the seminar. 
- Kees Blokland» His thesis is that small farmers who for the sake 
of mere subsistence have to attribute wage—labour in the export-
production (= semi-proletarians) may not be left out in the 
drive towards transition» This point is highighted by making 
a parallel with the Mexican situation, The policy suggestion made 
is to improve the position of the semi-proletarians, not prirnari-
ly through government servicing and credit policy but by rneans 
of improved salary conditions in the agro-export sector. This 
at the sane time secures labour supply for agro-export production 
and may eventually generate enlarged investments in the semi-
proletarian sector. 
- Jos Algra and Luud Clercxj their scepticism about the pace of 
the transitional process (owing to shortage of agro-technicians, 
the import substitution trap, reduced willingness to deliver 
wage-labour on behalf of the semi-proletarians wben their 
incoine position is structurally bettered, the relative unfavour-
able efficiency of small vs, larger scale fanning) leads them 
to advocate co-operative forms of agricultural organisation. 
In the discussion that follows a remark is made concluding Blok-
land to be needlessly pessimistic about the position of the 
agrarian semi-proletarlate in view of price and wage reforms already 
being nade. This in turn is contradicted by a remark made on 
evidence of lasting infertility of the semi-proletarian hillside 
lands, This being a consequence of the expulsion of small farmers 
from the fertile valleys in favour of the establishment of large-
scale export cropping by the somozistas. It is concluded that this 
situation being so togetber with the (revealed?) peasant mentality 
of small farmers urge even more the acquisition of land by 
the state» 
An extensive plead is made by Ken Post for collective agricultural 
organisation after land reform has taken place» His arguments 
refer to post reform diff©rentiation processes among the peasantry, 
linkages of the peasantry with urban merchantile interests, the 
facilitation of development funding by the state by means of 
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agrarian surplus extraction, as well as findings from the Chinese 
and Vietnamese models, like: the regulation of peasant incone 
and the security collectives may provide to peasants vis a vis 
state interests and, last but not least, the increase in product-
ivity not by means of mechanisation but by various means of 
rationing of the work performance. In the discussion the differing 
socio-cultural experience of Latin—America is ertiphasized. 
A reraark made about the highly organized state apparatus needed 
for such an extensive agrarian reform policy thrusts the discussion 
for a moment on the concept of 'peasant rationality'. A remark is 
made upon evidence that a concluded 80%" of nicaraguan small farmers 
opts for an individual-family farm system, 
The problem of chosing among alternative ways to iraprove the situa-
tion of the semi-proletariate is again touched upon bij stressing 
the positive effects a wage rise in the export sector may have. 
In the last part of the discussion the dilemma between agro-exports 
and domestic food supply as defined in De Groot's introduction is 
analysed in terms of land-utilization and settlement-schemes. The 
problem of land-utilization concerns the need to shift especially 
the extensive cattle raising from the fertile valleys to the fronte-
ra agrfcola. This in turn emphasises the problem of transmigration 
as resettlement has to take place compleinentary to the needed 
changes in land use patterns. 
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ANNEX 
LIST OF CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECTS 
(including cooperation projects) 
ON TRANSTION IN NICARAGUA 
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25/2/82 
RESEARCH ON SERVICES TO SMALL FARMERS IN NICARAGUA 
-• Research outline hy .Tos Algra and Luud Clercx, 
students with the dpts. of Comparative Socio-
Economic Studies (COSES) and Cultural Anthropology, 
University of Utrecht. 
Since Sandinist victory, government policy aims at 
transforming Nicaraguan economie structure and the 
society at large* In this* the agricultural sector 
plays a strategie role. Nearly 50% of the economie. 
active population is directly employed in this sector. 
Present' agrieultur -CL otï-ucturo in the result of o. 
dependent, neo-colonial development, in which the agro-
export sector (latifundios)> heavily dominated small scale 
food production for the dornestic market, (minifundios). 
This sharpened contradictions in the countryside and made 
Nicaragua as a whole dependent on fluctuations on foreign 
markets» (Por furthcr details see our discussion paper?). 
One of thfc most important tasks that Sandinist gvt. and 
mass organisations have set thcmselves is a transformation 
of this inheritcd socio-economic structuro, Which meonss 
rcducing dependency on the agro-export sector in the long 
term, and raising productio^ of basic consumption goods 
for dornestic markot in the short term» In this policy, 
expanding services extendcd to small farmers plays an 
important role. At the moment, credit and technical • ' 
p.ssistonce in particular are seen as important istruments 
to raise smal"', scale food production. 
In the propo-ood. research focus will be centered at credit, 
technical assistence and orgo,nisational aspects. A six-month 
fieldwork m one of the municipalities of the department of 
Mo,tagalpa will form part of the research. Prom the municipal 
level services are extendeci 'in concreto' to farmers. To get 
some idea of the effect of present policy on farmers' 
performance, some two or three villages (conmarcas) will be 
subjected to further investigation, 
- 96 -
So far, we succeeded in forming n. notion of the history of 
Nicaragua, the macro-economie structuref the agricultural 
structure, and past and present policies. Still lacking are 
data on the performance of present agricultural services, 
and on the oocio-sconomio aituation at municipal level. 
Én. elahorate research outline is forthcoming. 
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Dear co-participants of the seminar on the Nicaragua» revolution^ 
The research project which I am preparing since a month deals with 
the politioal process0f the licaraguan revolution and in particular. 
with the counterforcea - nationally as well as internationally — of 
the revolutionary" process© These oounterforces are containing the 
whole range of openly reactionary armsè counterrevolutionary forces 
inside and outside Nicaraguas but also the 'legal* opposition 
against the Sandinista road to socialism® Special attention needs 
in my opinion the in so many revolutions crucial position of the 
broad layers of the middle class» We remember the decisive role this 
(difficult in class terms to define) middlefclassf has been playing 
in for example the overthrow of the Unidad Popular governrnent and 
in lesc degree the breakdown of the Portugese revolution» Will the 
so cal]ed "third force" (Orlando Nunëz) in Nicaragua turn out to be 
ultimately a progressive oi' a reactionary force with respect of the 
further developmeat of the revolutionary processf 
In the present stage of the research project I am describing the 
development of the opposition against the Sandinista revolution, 
including -where present— their roots in the struggle against (or in 
favor of) the Somoaa-dictatorship* 
One of the main probjems I am confronting is the absence of anterior 
studies whioh are dealing with the counterforoes of a revolutions that 
is to say socialist revolution® 
Pjlagen: 
C O E H O O R N S T R A A T 93 •SS.Ï ;i er> N »{*; H G 5 « 'E .LEÏFOQN ( 0 8 0 ) 51 30 5 8 
VERVOUÏBLAD: -f 
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PATUM; 
I would be very glad if participants of the seminar do have 
sug^estions on literature oir studieg whieh would be interesting 
for me« Further is thls seminar in ray opinion nsayb© a,'. good 
start for people in Holland who are doing research on Nicaragua» 
Let us consider a more permanent structure where we discuss our 
progress and problems on our research on the revolution in 
Nicaragua» 
With good hppe that it will be a fruitful meeting on frjjrdayj th® 
26th8 see yuut 
Ted vaft Hees 
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Global outline for an inquiry to be done by a student-working-
group at the University of Tilburg. 
In our investigation attention will be focussed on the most 
important facts responsible for the unequel development of 
.the revolutionary movements in regional Nicaragua and Guate-
mala. Both structural and conjunctural facts will be taken 
into account. Also possible regipnal developments for both 
countries are to be outlined ( in a most careful way). 
Main questions are; | 
- What were (are) the goals of the revolutionary movements 
in both countries and what strategies are used to achieve 
them? 
- How is the regional revolutionary movement composed and ; 
organized in time? 
Part of the inquiry will consist of the regional consequences 
of the role the U.S. and multinationals played in both countries. 
Special attention will also be paid to a comparison of revolu-
tionary theories on one side and practice in both countries on 
the other. 
It will be clear that our function in this seminar will be no 
more than merely auditors. 
On behalf of the working group 
Rob van de Bogart, 
Marcel Blom, 
Ger Haan. 
Europalaan 523 
50^ -2 ZJ Tilburg 
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ê è. 
Research I n t e r e s t 
bttmk 
The Transition to Socialism: a Study of Vi|t Nam 
This project attempts to explore both the specificities and 
the more general implications of one of the most important 
attempts to adopt a socialist strategy for the transformation 
of a former colonial possession. It takes as a major point 
of focus the Communist Party which has attempted to bring 
about that transformation and follows it (in the course of 
three volumes) through the fuil trajectory of its development 
from 1930 to 1980. The study sets out to explore two main 
themes, the process by which the Party came to power, and how 
that has affected its strategy and policies once in control of 
the state, and the exact nature of the process of societal 
transformation which it attempted. A second major point of 
focus of the whole project is the implications of the Party's 
activities in terms of class formation and struggle. The ultimate 
intention is to show the structural contradictions - amounting 
in fact to a possible block on any further transition to socialism-
which have emerged as a result of the fifty years experience of 
the Communist-led revolution. 
It follows from the above that I have an interest from a 
comparative perspective in other countries, such as Nicaragua, 
which have also attempted or may come to attempt a socialist 
development strategy. Or particular relevance here is the 
period in North Viêt Nam of reconstruction after the first 
liberation war and'then of beginning specifically socialist policies, 
the years 1954-58. The reconstruction is dealt within the last part 
of my first volume and the launching of the socialist transformation 
in the early chapters of the second (on which I am now working). 
In addition, one of the topics to be dealt with in a more theoretical 
volume entitled 'Socialism and Underdevelopment", which I am now 
writing along with Phil Wright of the University of Sheffield, is 
the issue of launching the transition to socialism in countries such 
as Nicaragua. Unfortunately, however, that part is not yet written. 
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Datum: 
Onderwerp: 
Nicaraguan Study Group 
Toestel: yr j 
seminar on "the transition strategy 
of Nicaragua"» 
The Nicaraguan Study Group (NSG) is formed by students of different 
disciplines of the Vrije Universiteit-Amsterdam. lts aim is to contri-
bute to a more wider knowledge and consciousness of problems and 
possibilities in reference to the Nicaraguan situation. Results of 
the NSG will be used by the dutch Nicaraguan Committee and eventually 
published. The NSG operates within the broader organizational frame-
work of the Central American Workgroup of the VU-university. 
The NSG nas developped a study scheme that proceeds with major con-
clusions of earlier studies performed» The main conclusions that 
served as the basis for this year's course are: 
- the dilemma imposed on the agricultural policy by confronting 
security of internal food supply and the need to generate import 
capacity by means of agricultural exports. 
- the need to reform existing socio-political structures to benefit 
the poor, in the rural situation above all the landless and the 
small peasants. 
In reference to these conclusions the NSG has chosen the following . 
levels of analyses focussed on the agricultural sector: 
1. international context, limits and possibilities inherent to a 
development model based on mono-agricultural exports. This refers 
to the analyses of the diffei'ent forms of dependency imposed by 
a relative large external sector and to the possible means of 
augmenting the nation's autonomy eg. through diversification and 
substitutiun uï export produce. 
2. national context: departing from targets set out by the national 
development strategy (sufficiënt internal food supply, active 
participation of the people, independence, more equitable distri-
.bution of benefits as well as augmentation of production and 
productivity) an analyses of the possible role of the agricultural 
sector within the economy as a whole. Special consideration will 
be given to the improvement of inter sectoral linkages esp. between 
agriculture and industry (eg. through broadening import substitu-
tion by means of establishing agro-industry and possibly through 
the promotion of certain industrial exports directly benefitting 
agricultural development). 
3« sectoral level: the agricultural policy in rela'tion to the organi-
zation and functioning of a socialized subsector within the context 
of a mixed economy. clements of analyses are the mobilization and 
allocai.ion of inputs§ the organizational forms to be adopted in 
view of the dilemma between autonorny and control of the newly 
formed agricultural units| the rational for socializing means of 
production, the production proces itself and/or the distribution 
of the surplus, 
4. analyses of the different socio-political fractions esp. within 
the agricultural sector: the different interest they have and 
possible means of forming coalitions in the proces of agricultural 
reform. 
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Geske Dijkstra, sociologist and student of economy (last year) 
at the University of Groningen. 
I am studying the economy of Nicaragua from the viewpoint of the 
subject "Coniparative analysis of economie systems" (prof» nagner), 
and working on an essay about tiie ulanning of the industry-sector 
in Nicaragua,* 
V/hen I was in H • car gua last september I have asked to Kaarten 
Romijn, working at l.he "Fondo Internacional de Reconstrucción, 
departemento de cooperación tecnica oxtorna", if he could suggest 
me a problom l.o work on 1'or iny essay ("afstudeeropdracht"). 
The problem lic suggc i.cd me is: 
V/hat are the liiaitations of' bhe economie plaruiing 'oj iaic siate 
in a transition- economy? 
The government wants to r::activate production in the state- and 
the private sector» At the same time the goal is the changing of 
the relations of production» 
Are there solutions for the discrepancies between the state and the 
private sector? 
For an essay (which in Groningen is normally written in two months) 
this is a fairly large problem» I have chosen to concentrate myself 
on the planning of the industry. My argurnents are: 
- allthough a highcr priority is given to agriculture, industry 
is an important sector for Nicaragua. In the Jonger run the industry-
seetor is necessary to acliievc a r;reater international independence. 
- the above nientioned problem is especially very hard tot manage 
in the industry- sector (e*g« enterprise-owners don't invest which 
has long term consequences, the capital flow from industry is easier). 
- much can be learned from experiences of othor countries (Sovjet 
Union, China, Cuba); the'industrialization debate' is theoretically 
interosting. 
- to exclude the agricultural sector is a necessary restriction 
for a two month's - essay» 
I am still thinking about a central question for the paper» 
That could be : the relation botween the state and the enterprises, 
NICARAGUA AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS PROGRAMME (NAEP) 
inter - university cooperation project on 
'agricultural econoraics' between the Free 
University Amsterdam (FUA) and the Univer-
sidad Naciohal Autónoma de Nicaragua 
Summary descriptiqn of the inter-university cooperation programma on 
'Agricultural Economics' between the Free University Amsterdam (FUA) and the 
National University of Nicaragua (UNAN) 
1. Name of the project 
Nicaragua Agricultural Economics Programme (NAEP) ' 
2. Aims of the project 
The general objective of the project is to support the establishment of 
the programme of the pre-specialization 'Agricultural Economics' at 
the Economie Faculty of the National University of Nicaragua in the 
folioving four areas: 
- support to the curriculum-development process of the Department of 
Economics of the Economie Faculty of UNAN. Advice in matters 
concerning thé adjustment and completion of the curriculum and in 
the mauagement of the programme. 
- upgrading of taching and research (training) staff .and. programmes 
- implementation of research (training) activities to support the 
educational programme. 
- provide for an infras tructure for the teaching and research (training) 
activities, (planning, organization, preparation of educational 
materials, 'assistance to staff-members) 
The uitimate alm of the project is to consolidate the teaching of a 
practice-orienèed educational programme in the field of agricultural 
economics and to ensure the continuity of the programme through upgrading 
of the local sfcaff involved. 
3. Executing institu-tions 
The Economie Faculty of the National University of Nicaragua, hereafter 
called EF/UKAN 
The Economie Faculty of the Free University Amsterdam, hereafter called 
EF/FUA 
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The National University of Nicaragua (UNAN) is the main university of Nica-
ragua. The university has six locations among whom Managua and Léon are 
the most important ones. The number of students at UNAN in the academie year , 
1979-1980 was about 22,000 and will probably grow to 25 - 27,000 in 1981. 
The number of teaching posts (in full-time equivalents) amounts to 443 
(average student-staff ratio 50:1). 
Because of the massive inflow of new students after the national liberation 
war and the departure of many of the most qualified staff-members to positions 
in the public sector (ministeries, state anterprises) there is a consideratie 
shortage of well qualified personnel ('understaffing'). f 
A procêss of reform of the educational programs (with respect to both the 
structure and the context of the programs) has been started to cope with the 
urgent needs of the country for many practically trained specialists. 
The Economie Faculty of UNAN offers study programs in three branches: (general) 
Economics, Business Administration and Accountancy. The Faculty has about 
6000 students (1980-1981). 
The number of students in de Department of Economics amounts to 2500. Most 
of these students (90 percent) takes lectures in the evening; they are sup-
posed to work during day time, proof of which is required. The number of 
teaching posts at the Department of Economics amounts to 70, of whom only 29 
are full-tiae teachers. 
Especially in this Department there has been a massive inflow of new students 
after the end of the national liberation war and this situation is likely to 
continue in future years. 
The Department of Economics has developed plans to revise its educational 
programs. The former program consisted of one year for general studies, 
foliowed by 7 semesters (8 semesters in the evening program) of studies in 
general economics. After this period a small number of students could com-
plete a specialized course in agricultural economics. The majority of the 
students only corapleted the general degree program. 
The new program of studies consists of one semester of general studies (pre 
entry science and lessons in the history oi the Sandinist Revolution), foliowed 
by 7 semesters (8 in the evening program) of general economics. In addition 
to the subjects of the old program several new subjects will be introduced e.g. 
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BREVE DESCRIPCION DEL PROGRAMA 
1«1 Que es el P r o g r a m a Centroamericano de F o r m a -
ción en Desarrol lo Agropecuario y Reforma Agra-
r ia ? 
E s un esfuerzo de la Revolución Popular Sandinis-
ta para capacitar r ecur sos humanos que den r e s -
puestas sat isfactorias a las necesidades de t r a n s -
formación del sector ag ra r io . 
Es te programa se proyecta a escala nacional, Cen-
t roamer icana y del Caribe y su acento descansa en 
las disciplinas de las Ciencias Sociales , en virtud 
de la e se as ez agudade cuadros en e l sec to r agrar io 
que la-s dominen» 
1.2 Que objetivos persigue el P r o g r a m a ? 
&) El objetivo cent ra l es la formación de cdmpa-
fleros que impulsen los procesos de t rans for -
rtiación ag ra r i a bajo c r i t e r ios cientfficos. 
b) C r e a r condiciones adecuadas pa ra una r e -
flexión continua y s is temat ica sobre el de-
sa r ro l lo del sector y sus in ter re lac iones con 
e l r e s to de la economfa, 
' c) Contribuir a la democratizacjón del conoci-
miento cienfcifico, mediante una e s t ruc tu ra pi -
ramida l de formación, 
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I. AREAS DE FORMACIÓN 
2 .1 Area de Teorfa y 
nómicas» 
Este a r ea pretende 
el manejo de los in 
de la& Ciencias Soc 
to r rurale 
E l I r e a abarca do 
guientes : 
I , Economfa; 
a) La economfa m 
de t rabajo , lo 
nómico. 
b) La t rans ic ión , 
periencias t r a 
sector agra r i 
económica en 
I C / ' 
c) Econortfa del socialisme* 
d) La economfa polftica del agro , que comprende 
la economfa agra r ia y el estudio de las refor-
mas agrar ias en America Latina, la planifica-» 
ción agropecuaria , etc« 
e) La producción y reproducción del capital» 
f) El des^rrol lo agropecuario, que comprende la 
gestion; empre sa r | a l y las opciones de da» 
g&rrolte agropecuario, 
Cienciag Sèciales» 
g) Ani l is is h i s t ó r i e c que comprende la h is tor ia 
social y económica de Centroamér ica con én-
fasis en la de Nicaragua y las pr actie as de in-
vestigacion his tor ica bajo el r igor del método 
cientffico» 
h) Los movimientos campesinos y los seminarios 
y pract icas de capacitación campesina» 
*) E l estado en su es t ruc tura y función, que com-
prende su formulación t eór ica , su expresion
 t 
his tor ica , su papel en la politica ag ra r i a y las 
pract icas y procedimientos institucionales del 
estado para el sec tor . 
j) Clases socia les , ideologia y el estado» 
k) Investigación y Capacitación Campesina, 
Area Técnica de Apoyo. 
a) Técnicfas Agropecuar ias . 
b) Formulacion y Evaluación de Proyeetos 
e) Técnicas de Planificación 
d) Técnicas de Gest 
SUCA, _etc* 
e) Técnicas de Düu 
s ion. 
f) Técnic»s d© Inves 
El a rea de técnica 
de acuerdo a las. n 
~ participantes» 
2*3 Area de Extensión.- S 
pantes pedagógicamente 
en condiciones de capac 
dos de este programa» 
2 .4 Area de Temas Especia 
En el t r a n s c u r s o d e c a d a 
seminar ios sobre t ema 
con las necesidades del 
pantes» 
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